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THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE ACCORDING TO
THE SUPREME COURT: THE MYSTERIOUS
ECLIPSE OF FREE EXERCISE VALUES
Nancy H. Fink*
I. INTRODUCTION
The entire concept of constitutional government rests upon the belief
that continuity and stability are both desirable and necessary if a political
society is to survive the vicissitudes of social, political, and economic
life. This belief, in turn, rests upon the assumption that some fundamen-
tal principles can be discovered and preserved in a written document.
Our constitutional provisions are, however, but the vaguest outline of
social principles which, if they are to enjoy any efficacy at all, must be
interpreted and conscientiously preserved.
One of the first principles of American constitutionalism and one of
the most fundamental ideas of modern western society is the concept of
religious freedom. The yearning for religious tolerance was one of the
primary motivations which drove our ancestors to the new world. Reli-
gious freedom, which is among the more significant ideas of enlighten-
ment, ultimately found its way into the United States Constitution.
Although incorporated in the first amendment,' the right to religious
freedom has not, however, remained completely unfettered, for our
founding fathers shared an equally strong belief in the "nonestablish-
ment" ideal. 2 Recent developments under these related clauses indicate
* Associate Professor, Brooklyn Law School.
1. "Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]
. ... U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1.
2. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion .... U.S.
CONST. amend. I, cl. I. In most discussions of the religion clauses of the first amendment,
the term "establishment clause" has been used to refer to this language in the first
amendment. It is logically more accurate to use the term "nonestablishment principle"
which Professor Giannella uses in his extensive discussion of the religion clauses. Gian-
nella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development, Part II: The
Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REV. 513 (1968). This article will use both the
conventional phrase, "establishment clause", and the more accurate term, "nonestablish-
ment principle."
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that the Supreme Court has fostered an unfortunate tension which
threatens to significantly weaken the fundamental guarantee of religious
freedom.
It is this tension between fostering religious freedom and preventing an
establishment of religion which has increasingly occupied the Supreme
Court in recent years, 3 primarily as a result of the proliferation of state
legislative efforts to provide financial assistance to nonpublic schools
caught in the pinch of escalating educational costs. State legislators have
been motivated not only by their concern for protecting the public
schools from the disastrous consequence of having to absorb millions of
students if private schools are forced to close, but also by a genuine
concern with the educational quality of nonpublic schools. Numerous
programs have been developed to upgrade the total services provided
nonpublic school students. Public monies have been expended for trans-
portation, books, lunches, and medical services in an effort to provide
some parity between public and nonpublic schools. Each new legislative
effort has met with court challenges protesting the threat of establish-
ment inhering in government programs which touch religious activities or
institutions. One should not lose sight of the fact that state legislatures
have themselves interpreted the religion clauses in formulating these
various programs. The major disagreement between the legislatures and
the Supreme Court stems from the divergent approaches of each to the
balancing of free exercise and establishment ideals. While the legisla-
tures have tended to favor the protection of the free exercise right, the
Supreme Court has increasingly stressed the fundamentality of nones-
tablishment values.
In the past three decades, the Supreme Court has decided more than
two dozen cases of major significance involving the interpretation of the
religion clauses of the first amendment. From these cases, several major
issues of continuing interest have emerged, together with a patchwork of
results which, under close scrutiny, reveal inherent contradictions. This
article will attempt to demonstrate the existence of these contradictions,
to analyze them, and to suggest both a plausible explanation and a
possible means of avoiding future contradictions in this sensitive area of
religious liberty.
Exploration of seven cases decided over the past three decades, 4 each
involving an alleged violation of the establishment clause and/or the free
3. The Court has been increasingly involved with establishment clause cases. Since
1970, the Court has decided eight cases of major significance interpreting this clause.
4. This article will discuss in detail only seven of these decisions in that they form the
core of the dilemma. The cases are: Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Board
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exercise clause, will demonstrate that from a logical and historical per-
spective, the cases are fundamentally irreconcilable and result in the
denial of true religious liberty to many Americans. Moreover, this result
is neither demanded by anything within the four corners of the Constitu-
tion nor by any other sufficiently compelling cause to justify the denial
of so fundamental a right as freedom of religion.
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW
The Court's decisions under the religion clauses have held that Sunday
closing laws are constitutionally permissible because they neither tend to
establish religion nor interfere with the free exercise thereof, even
though they may work severe financial hardship on Saturday Sabbath
observers. 5 No exemption from the ban on Sunday activities is constitu-
tionally required for those who observe another day of rest. 6 Saturday
Sabbath observers must, however, be given special consideration in the
operation of unemployment laws, and cannot be denied unemployment
benefits under the rubric of "unavailable for employment" if the "unav-
ailability" stems from Saturday Sabbath observance.' Furthermore, ex-
emptions from the payment of property taxes granted to religious institu-
tions by most states are permissible.8
The Court's decisions respecting religion and public schools hold that
children attending public schools cannot be made to salute the flag if
their religious scruples direct otherwise. 9 The Court has also held that the
accommodation of religious instruction by release-time programs is per-
missible'0 as long as the programs are not conducted on school proper-
ty." Both prayers 2 and Bible reading 3 are forbidden in public schools,
even though they may be nondenominational and despite provisions
excusing those children who do not wish to participate. In addition, the
of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) [hereinafter cited as PEARL v. Nyquist]; Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977). Other cases are
mentioned only as they may bear upon these decisions.
5. See Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Supermkt., 366 U.S. 617 (1961); Two Guys v.
McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
6. See note 5, supra.
7. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
8. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
9. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
10. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
11. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
12. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
13. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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state cannot, on the basis of a religious doctrine, forbid the teaching of
certain theories or areas of subject matter such as evolution. 4 Finally,
children whose families wish to protect them from the secularizing
forces of the world, cannot be compelled to attend public schools past
the eighth grade under existing compulsory education laws if the parents'
desires are based upon longstanding and sincere religious beliefs.15
Court decisions in the area of financial assistance to children attending
parochial schools reveal that the state may constitutionally provide funds
to parents for bus transportation of their children to parochial schools'
6
and may provide funds for textbooks to be used for the teaching of
secular subjects in the parochial schools, at least when the books are
merely "loaned" to the children.' 7 The state may also "supply for use by
pupils attending nonpublic schools . .. such standardized tests and
scoring services as are used in the public schools of the state" to
measure the progress of students in secular subjects;S "provide speech
and hearing diagnostic services to pupils attending nonpublic schools" in
the sectarian institutions when the services are performed by state 19
employees; and provide diagnostic psychological services under similar
conditions.20
Therapeutic, guidance, and remedial services for students who have
been identified as having a need for special attention are sanctioned
when they are provided "in public schools, in public centers, or in
mobile units located off the nonpublic premises." '21
Issues of government financial aid to higher education have also reach-
ed the Court. It has approved federal financing of the construction of
buildings on denominational college campuses as long as these buildings
are not used for religious instruction or worship.22 Similarly, a state may
use its authority to aid private sectarian colleges in financing construc-
tion and improvement of facilities to be used for nonreligious purposes
14. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
15. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
16. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
17. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). See also Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S.
229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
18. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. at 238-39 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.06(J)
(Page Supp. 1976), cf. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (textbook loan program
upheld but instructional materials loan programs and auxiliary services program in-
validated).
19. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. at 241 (quoting OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.06(D)
(Page Supp. 1976)).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 244-45 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3317.06(G)-(I), (H) (Page Supp.
1976)).
22. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
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by the institution. 23 In one of its latest decisions, the Court has permitted
a state to provide noncategorical grants to religiously affiliated colleges,
provided the funds are not utilized by the institution for sectarian pur-
poses. 24
The ways in which states may not aid denominational schools are also
interesting. A state may not supplement the salaries of nonpublic school
teachers of secular subjects in parochial schools, even though the sup-
plemented teacher's salary does not exceed the maximum paid to public
school teachers. 25 A state may not "purchase" educational services from
the parochial schools despite the fact that the contracts of "purchase"
involve only actual expenditures by the parochial schools for teacher's
salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials for secular courses which
are the same as those taught in the public schools. 26 Furthermore, states
may not provide for direct money grants to qualifying private schools for
the maintenance and repair of school facilities and equipment to insure
the health, welfare, and safety of enrolled pupils. 27
Another legislative scheme which has been declared unconstitutional
is one which provided tuition reimbursement to parents of children
attending nonpublic schools, if the parents' taxable income did not
exceed $5,000 per year, even though the amount of reimbursement was
limited to $50 per year for grade school children and $100 for those in
high school.2 8 A complementary provision for those ineligible for the
tuition reimbursement plan which provided a sliding scale of relief in-
versely proportional to the parents' income was also declared uncon-
stitutional .29
It is also impermissible for a state to reimburse parochial schools for
the costs of administering examinations, keeping attendance records,
and complying with other reporting requirements mandated by state
law.30 A state may not provide auxiliary services such as counseling,
testing and psychological services, speech and hearing therapy, and
teaching for exceptional, remedial, and educationally disadvantaged chil-
•23. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
24. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
25. Early v. DiCenso and Robinson v. DiCenso, sub. nom. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 615-20 (1971).
26. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
27. PEARL v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
28. Id. A similar program, in which no limitation was placed on parental income and
reimbursements were limited to $75 and $150 respectively, met the same fate. Sloan v.
Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973).
29. PEARL v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
30. Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
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dren.31 Nor may the state provide loans of instructional materials and
equipment such as periodicals, photographs, maps, charts, sound
recordings, films, projection equipment, recording equipment, and labo-
ratory equipment, either to the nonpublic schools3 2 or to the students
themselves. 33 In addition, the state may not supply transportation for
field trips to nonpublic school students, even though such trips are
limited to secular instructional objectives. 34
This statement of the bare holdings suggests that the Supreme Court,
in order to produce these results, has developed some rather complex
relationships between constitutional factors, given the seemingly open-
textured language of the first amendment. It appears that the Court has
groped its way through historical, logical, and essentially pragmatic
analyses in search of guideposts for the interpretation and application of
the religion clauses. At times it has paused, satisfied that it had dis-
covered the fundamental truth concerning the relationship between
church and state under the Constitution, only to discover, all too soon,
that a new circumstance has emasculated its previous formulation. 35
III. THE ARGUMENT: NONESTABLISHMENT AT THE EXPENSE OF FREE
EXERCISE
The major thesis of this article is that the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the establishment clause conflicts at a fundamental level with a
reasoned interpretation of the free exercise clause. In interpreting the
two clauses, the Court has isolated them in order to avoid confronting
this inconsistency, and in so doing seems implicitly to prefer the nones-
tablishment principle at the expense of the free exercise principle in its
constitutional hierarchy. This preference for nonestablishment values
over those of free exercise has its origins in the Enlightenment ideals of
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison.
The extensive reliance of the Supreme Court on the views of Jefferson
and Madison as the embodiment of first amendment wisdom is mis-
placed. Not only is it misplaced because the opinions of all other partici-
pants in the constitution-making process have been ignored, but also
31. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
32. Id.
33. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. at 248-51.
34. Id. at 252-55.
35. As Professor Sutherland, Jr., in describing phrases the Court has substituted for
due process of law, stated: "Each new phrase is more satisfactory only because for a time
it is less familiar. As each in turn inevitably loses its potency, we find and substitute
another." Sutherland, Due Process and Disestablishment, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1306, 1307
(1949).
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because Madison's and Jefferson's view of the appropriate relationship
between church and state was undoubtably colored by historical circum-
stances. But historical circumstances change, and the possibility of es-
tablishment in America today is as remote as established churches were
realities in 1791. The significant changes in American society since the
ratification of the Bill of Rights require careful consideration in deter-
mining how the principle of nonestablishment should be interpreted in
order to achieve the ideals embodied in the free exercise clause, as well
as those in the nonestablishment clause. There has been a startling lack
of sensitivity to this relationship in most of the Court's opinions.
The Court's extensive reliance upon the writings of Jefferson and
Madison can be explained in large measure by the fact that the vision of
religion and secular life which those writings espouse is essentially
compatible with the dominant American religious experience-Protes-
tantism. The ideal of total separation of religious experience into the
private realm of individual and family experience is a product of both the
Reformation and the Enlightenment. This ideal is clearly compatible with
the beliefs of Protestant Americans, who until very recently have domi-
nated the institutions of power and influence in American society. As a
product of the Enlightenment, it reflects a movement away from a social
structure in which religious and secular experience were integrated to-
ward a predominantly secular society. This model of organization pro-
ceeds from the basic premise that socio-religious experience is a private
affair between man and God. From this it derives the secondary prem-
ises that society is therefore separable from religious experience, and
that in order to preserve the fundamental right to freedom of religion,
society must erect and maintain a wall of separation between itself and
religion.
While this view is compatible with Protestantism and comforting to the
growing community of secularists, it is fundamentally antagonistic with
other religious traditions in America. It is the essence of Catholicism,
Orthodox Judaism, and some other minority religions in America that
religious experience is pervasive. Separation of secular and religious
experience is an anathema-a denial of religious teaching at its most
essential level. The high and impregnable wall of separation which much
of the Supreme Court's rhetoric envisions does not promote the cause of
religious freedom for those who believe in the integration of secular and
religious life. It places a high premium on the preservation of that
religious tradition. The price one pays is the denial of full participation in
the largess of the welfare state.
1978]
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The modern welfare state redistributes vast sums of money. The
efforts of the Supreme Court to maintain the antiseptic separation of
secular and religious life has repeatedly frustrated state legislative efforts
to create greater equality of benefit for religious minorities in the support
which the state provides for various activities-principally educational.
This denial of full participation in the redistributive efforts of the welfare
states occurs precisely because those to whom the benefits are denied
have insisted upon the free exercise of their chosen religions-religions
which cannot accommodate the Supreme Court's need for total separa-
tion of the secular and religious activities concerned. There has been
practically no effort on the part of the Supreme Court to explain why the
denial of significant governmental benefits because of religious practice
and belief does not result in the denial of either the right to free exercise
or the equal protection of the laws.
Constitutional principles, although not infinitely flexible, nevertheless
should be sufficiently open-textured to permit a reworking of the tan-
gible effects of such principles in order to effectuate their underlying
ideals. What may have been an appropriate response to establishment
problems in 1791 is not necessarily appropriate, and indeed, may very
well be totally inappropriate, in 1978. In its establishment clause analy-
sis, the Court has ignored the fact that there are significant distinctions
between that which the Constitution compels and that which it forbids.
When setting forth minimum standards of constitutionally mandated
behavior, the Court should follow a narrow model of constitutional
interpretation, but when legislatively approved state activities are chal-
lenged on constitutional grounds, federalism demands that the court
should adopt a more flexible approach so as to permit the widest possible
latitude for state prerogatives. Educational policymaking is one of the
more significant powers retained by the states under our constitutional
system. In the twentieth century we have witnessed a massive shift of
authority from the states to the federal realm-a shift which has been
either facilitated or mandated by Supreme Court decisions. The con-
siderable circumscription of legislative autonomy may, in some instances
such as racial integration, be socially as well as constitutionally neces-
sary, but that is clearly not the case in all other instances of judicially
imposed restrictions.
The Court has simply failed to give due deference to state legislative
processes. In particular, its concern with the politically divisive potential
of state efforts to aid financially distressed parochial schools is blatantly
disingenuous. The Court's inflexible requirement of separation has re-
peatedly frustrated legitimate efforts of state legislatures to reach politic-
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ally acceptable programs of educational value for millions of children
through the democratic process of debate and compromise. The potential
for divisiveness lies not in the state legislative process, but in the over-
zealous use of the power of judicial review to preserve the nonestablish-
ment ideal when what is required is the heightened sensitivity to free
exercise values which is enhanced by many of the state programhs which
the Court has invalidated.
A new model for decision making is needed in this important and
sensitive area of constitutional law. The Court should abandon its some-
what mechanical and arbitrarily-invoked separation formula in favor of
a model which focuses upon the nature of the benefit sought to be
provided and the status of the recipient with respect to the benefit,
without regard to religious criteria. Such a model might ask the following
question with respect to establishment clause problems: Is any person,
as a result of the government action in issue, enjoying a benefit on
account of his/her religious commitment which is not equally and similar-
ly available to all other persons, similarly situated with respect to the
benefit involved, without regard to religious criteria? It is very difficult
to understand how religion would be advanced, much less established,
by the evenhanded distribution of secular government benefits to all
individuals similarly situated, with respect to need and without regard to
religious affiliation or belief. It is equally difficult to understand how
denial of such benefits to persons because of their religious beliefs or
practices does not inhibit the free exercise of religion. Certainly the
Supreme Court should not compel such results by invalidating state
efforts which alleviate them when the state's purpose is clearly a legiti-
mate secular one. Furthermore, a potential bonus is provided by this
approach. Should the Supreme Court abandon its rigid separationist
ideology in favor of a benefit oriented analysis, another major obstacle,
the entanglement problem, would be removed, since it is a product of the
Court's unwarranted focus on an antiseptic separation of secular and
religious activity. Entanglement issues arise only through the concern
that any aid to a religious institution, albeit for secular purposes, will
necessitate supervision to prevent integration of that admittedly secular
activity with a religious one. The proposed model would eliminate this
concern, since it accepts the integrated nature of secular and religious
activity as a protected free exercise right for those religions which do not
accept the fundamentally Protestant ideology of separation.
If this proposed model or some other formulation which focuses upon
the nature of the benefit to the individual vis-A-vis all others similarly
situated were to be accepted, we would, as a society, have taken a major
1978]
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step in the direction of substantive, rather than formal, freedom of
religion for all Americans.
IV. AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The history of the relationship between church and state in America
has been a topic of considerable interest over the years. The most
important view of that relationship has necessarily been that of the
Supreme Court which derives its major premises primarily from the
writings of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, particularly the litera-
ture surrounding the historic struggle of Virginia to abolish public sup-
port of the ministry which culminated in the enactment of the Virginia
Bill for Establishing Religious Liberty.36 There has been a near blind
faith that the opinions of these two giants of American constitutional
history accurately reflect the purpose and intent of the framers and
ratifiers in 1791. They have defined for us the broad framework of the
constitutionally permissible relationship between church and state. In
light of "the sacred tradition in American constitutional law. . . that the
principal responsibility of judges is to carry out the 'intention' of those
who framed the Constitution," ,7 those opinions remain the guiding prin-
ciples of the 1970's. The unfortunate consequence of this has been that
"by virtue of the political authority vested in the Supreme Court of the
United States, its judges have sometimes exercised the enviable power
of converting questionable history into unquestionable law." 38 Accord-
ing to this "official" view of the religion clauses, not only is the individu-
al's conscience free from intrusion in religious matters, but the Constitu-
tion also imposes a duty upon the government to refrain from taking any
36. Of special significance in this regard, is the highly celebrated MEMORIAL AND
REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS written by James Madison to the
General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia in protest against the use of tax
monies to pay the salaries of teachers of the Christian religion. It was out of this struggle,
and largely through the efforts of James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, that Virginia's
Bill for Establishing Religious Liberty was finally enacted in 1786. See B. BAILYN, THE
IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 246 (1967). This bill became the
prototype for the religion clauses of the first amendment, for, according to E. SMITH,
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 247 (1972), "[t]he role of James Madison in the
fashioning of the Bill of Rights thrust the Virginia experience to the center of the debate
on the text of the First Amendment."
It is noteworthy that the MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE was central to the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Rutledge in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 63 (1947),
appearing as an appendix to the opinion. It has been cited in both majority and minority
opinions of numerous cases since.
37. M. DEWOLFE HOWE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION: RELIGION AND THE FREE
SOCIETY 49 (1958) (Fund for the Republic Pamphlet.)
38. Id.
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action respecting the establishment of religion although there will be no
resulting interference with individual conscience in religious matters.39
The extensive reliance of the Supreme Court on the views of Jefferson
and Madison has not been an unmitigated good. As one recent observer
put it, "there is no doubt that Americans have enjoyed important bene-
fits as a result of Jefferson's successful campaign to disestablish religion
at the national level . . . . What has had great benefits, however, has
also had some costs."4
One of the major "costs" of this reliance is the product of an uncritical
expansion of Jefferson's view that the state is precluded from any
relationship with religion even though that relationship neither interferes
with nor diminishes the religious freedom of other individuals or groups
of individuals in the community. Jefferson's attitude can be traced to the
wellspring of his intellectual universe, 4' the Enlightenment, with all of its
emphasis upon rationalism and man's "emancipation" from the fetters
of theological dogma and piety.42 With this "emancipation" necessarily
39. But cf. Welsch v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380
U.S. 163 (1965) (conscientious objector cases decided on non-constitutional grounds). See
also Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S, 437 (1971).
40. Little, Thomas Jefferson's Religious Views and Their Influence on the Supreme
Court's Interpretation of the First Amendment, 26 CATH. U.L. REV. 57, 58 (1976).
41. Jefferson was the pre-eminent American exponent, along with Benjamin
Franklin, of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. Whether the Enlightenment is
considered an intellectual movement, a temper of mind, or a climate of opinion,
whether it is dismissed, denounced, or admired, Jefferson was one of its legiti-
mate children, in the end one of its authentic geniuses ....
The controlling assumptions of enlightened thought were so thoroughly as-
similated in Jefferson's mind that he cannot possibly be understood apart from
them.
M. PETERSON, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE NEW NATION 46-47 (1970).
42. According to Merrill Peterson, the first principles of Enlightenment as assimilated
by Jefferson were:
First, untrammeled free inquiry in the pursuit of knowledge. Nothing was to be
taken for granted; everything was to be questioned, taken apart, traced back to its
origins, and reconstructed in the light of intelligence . . . . Philosophy was a
method of inquiry, not a static system of truths; and empirical science on the
Newtonian model was good in all fields, the moral and social together with the
physical ....
Second, the object of inquiry is the discovery of the natural order of things.
Newton had demonstrated the order of the physical universe; Linnaeus had
begun to put order into the chaos of life; and Locke, on the same empirical
principles, had pointed the way to a science of mind. Were there not universal
laws, roughly equivalent to the law of gravitation, in the moral and social realms?
There were, the eighteenth-century philosophers insisted, but they lay buried
under the rubble heaped up over the centuries by dogmatic authority and supersti-
tion. ...
Third, reason is the principal agent of criticism and inquiry-reason, that is, not
as "eternal verities" but as a method of verification. Aggressively secular,
1978]
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came a decidedly anticlerical bias, a deep-seated suspicion of religious
organization and hierarchy. 43 This scepticism has been translated by the
Supreme Court into another dogma-a rule of constitutional law."
The vision of the founding fathers with respect to the relationship
between church and state was inseparable from their vision of each of
those institutions. Neither time nor history has stood still, and according-
ly neither church nor state bear even a remote resemblance to any
reasonable vision thereof which may have been entertained by our
founding fathers. How, then, is it reasonable to assume that the founding
fathers separatist vision will accomplish any of the underlying purposes
of the religious protection of the first amendment? As Professor Giannel-
la has stated:
[T]he founding fathers were assuming a government of highly
limited powers. They expected religion to play a part in the
established social order, but also expected the state to play a
minimal role in forming that order. . . . But now that the state
has undertaken the more positive role of allocating resources
and actively structuring the social order, the question of how to
treat religious groups and interests has become a fundamentally
different one from that confronting our predecessors. To with-
hold studiously from religious groups all benefits flowing from
governmental structuring of the social order will not only result
enlightened thinkers exposed bigotry and superstition, denounced airy
"metaphysical" speculation, and leveled the walls of mystery and authority
separating man from nature.
Id. at 47.
43. [Jefferson] had no respect for the Established Church on any ground, and his
reading of the modern rationalists, principally English and Scottish, conveyed
him to that convenient via media of the Enlightenment, natural religion, between
orthodoxy and atheism . . . [With respect to religion there were] two main
propositions for enlightened men. First, that the Christianity of the churches was
unreasonable, therefore unbelievable, but that stripped of priestly mystery, ritu-
al, and dogma, reinterpreted in the light of historical evidence and human experi-
ence, and substituting the Newtonian cosmology for the discredited Biblical one,
Christianity could be conformed to reason. Second, morality required no divine
sanction or inspiration, no appeal beyond reason and nature, perhaps not even the
hope of heaven or the fear of hell; and so the whole edifice of Christian revelation
came tumbling to the ground . . ..
Dismissing revelation, divine grace, and the future state of Christianity, dis-
missing, in short, the religion of the churches, Jefferson believed that natural
reason and the evidence of the senses provided a sufficient basis of religion and
ethics.
Id. at 50-52.
44. M. DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 7 (1965).
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in deprivations not demanded by the purposes of nonestablish-
ment but in some cases will actually frustrate them. 45
Professor Bernard Bailyn has written that "the most advanced pre-
Revolutionary arguments for disestablishment-arguments that would
eventually bear fruit in all governments of the new nation-were unsta-
ble compounds of narrow denominationalism and broad libertarian-
ism." '46 While the "denominational" arguments, as Bailyn calls them,
incontrovertibly rested upon concern for the free exercise of religion by
dissenters, the libertarian views appear to have had a more tenuous
connection with the exercise of religion and a more cogent relationship to
the enlightenment ideal of a secular society guided by man's illimitable
capacity to create a morally just and socially viable community without
reliance upon religious ideology or faith. The views of Jefferson and
Madison represent more clearly the second variety of arguments, al-
though perhaps partially influenced by claims of persecuted dissenters,47
and were "encrusted with certain implicit assumptions which were prod-
ucts of prevailing social, political, and economic conditions." 48
Constitutionalism springs from man's impulse to preserve certain fun-
damental values. Presumably, the preservation of those values implicit in
the religion clauses of the first amendment was the primary objective of
the authors as well as the ratifiers of the Bill of Rights. "Specific intent"
is a term of considerably narrower and more temporally specific conno-
tation than that of underlying or fundamental value. Since the specific
intent of the framers was necessarily determined by historical contingen-
cies, it ought not to weigh heavily on future generations, at least when
the fundamental objectives inherent in the Constitution are discoverable.
While modern philosophy has convinced us that even fundamental
values change over time, we may nevertheless entertain the presumption
that the rate of change diminishes in direct proportion to the extent to
which particular values are held to be fundamental by a particular soci-
ety. Constitutional interpretation must operate on this premise if it is to
be anything more than a mere reflection of transitory trends in the
political sphere.49
45. Giannella, supra note 2, at 514-15.
46. B. BAILYN, supra note 36, at 257.
47. Id. at 260.
48. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment and Doctrinal Development, Part I:
The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1383 (1967).
49. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 665 (1943), said:
The Court has no reason for existence if it merely reflects the pressures of the
day. Our system is built on the faith that men set apart for this special function,
freed from the influences of immediacy and from the deflections of worldly
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Changing historical conditions must bear upon the means by which
underlying constitutional objectives are to be achieved. It is idle foolish-
ness to suppose that unchanging responses to vastly different problems
arising in monumentally altered social and economic circumstances can
be expected to produce results which are consistent with the underlying
purposes of the Constitution. 50 In the context of the religion clauses of
the first amendment, the transformation of American society has been so
extensive as to call into serious question the continuing validity of any
earlier doctrinal formulations of the constitutionally mandated relation-
ship between religion and the state. The failure of the Court to recognize
the need for this extensive reevaluation of its dogmatic interpretation of
the establishment clause has resulted in the substantial impairment of the
right of free exercise by millions of Americans. While this may yet prove
to be the inevitable consequence of the preservation of our religious
liberty, there is a need for a more systematic attempt to analyze the
underlying purposes of the religion clauses and how best to achieve these
objectives under present social, political, and economic circumstances. 51
The Court's timeworn rhetoric about Virginia's historic struggle to pre-
serve the freedom of choice of each individual in religious matters has
done little to comfort those who see that freedom as substantially illus-
ory for many Americans. It is one thing to say "not one penny" shall be
taken from a taxpayer to support ministers of religion in 178552 and to
repeat, nearly 200 years later, that "not one penny" shall be taken from a
taxpayer to provide remedial reading, guidance counseling, and other
special educational services to educationally deprived children who at-
tend parochial schools, although identical services are provided by the
state to children in the public school system. 3 The real concern ought
not to be how the framers of the Constitution would have resolved the
particular issue before the Court, but what they believed to be the
ambition, will become able to take a view of longer range than the period of
responsibility entrusted to Congress and legislatures.
50. See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910), in which Justice
McKenna stated:
In the application of a constitution, therefore, our contemplation cannot be only
of what has been but of what may be. Under any other rule a constitution would
indeed be as easy of application as it would be deficient in efficacy and power. Its
general principles would have little value and be converted by precedent into
impotent and lifeless formulas. Rights declared in words might be lost in reality.
51. An analysis along the lines of Professor Giannella's comprehensive critique in his
two part article entitled Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment and Doctrinal Development,
which can be found in 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381 (1967) and 81 HARY. L. REV. 513 (1968),
would be welcome.
52. See JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE, supra note 36.
53. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
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fundamental purposes underlying the religion clauses and how best to
achieve those purposes under contemporary circumstances. 4
Late eighteenth century American society was a Protestant culture.
Nineteenth century America witnessed perhaps the greatest influx of
culturally diverse people any nation has ever experienced. When the
revolutionary thrust of industrialization and modern secularization is
added to this cultural milieu, it becomes obvious that American society
has become significantly less homogeneous with respect to religious and
other cultural values than it was in 1791. The likelihood, in this cultural
climate, of anything remotely resembling a traditional "establishment"
is infinitesimal. While recognizing that the nonestablishment principle
was intended to reach relationships between government and religion
which were substantially less than full-fledged establishments, one might
nevertheless consider this diminished risk as an important factor in
evaluating the permissible scope of government associations designed to
enhance free exercise rights of Americans, as opposed to those associa-
tions which impinge in some measurable way upon them. 5
There is another facet of the development of constitutional doctrine
from the ideological polemics of Jefferson and Madison which warrants
attention. The Enlightenment is frequently cited as the fountainhead of
modern secularism, and there is undoubtedly a significant relationship
between the two. One should not forget, however, that the Enlighten-
ment would have been unthinkable without the Reformation. The rejec-
tion of a monolithic church, the assertion of the right of skeptical inquiry
into religious dogma and the shift of focus from religious observance in
the community to the individual's personal faith and relationship with
God, all served to pave the way for the skepticism and rationalism of the
Enlightenment. Modern secularism, born with the Enlightenment and
nourished by modernity, might logically be called the illegitimate heir of
54. We try to make the most of the consequences of what our forefathers did, but
there is no reason why we should feel we have to carry out their plans for us.
Were they so wise they didn't need to know the facts? The intention of the
framers of the Constitution, even assuming we could discover what it was, when
it is not adequately expressed in the Constitution, that is to say, what they meant
when they did not say it, surely has no binding force upon us . . . . What they
left unsaid they left open for us to decide . ...
The Constitution has become something in its own right. It is an integral part of
what men do with it. It has long ceased to be no more than what other men do
with it. It has long ceased to be no more than what other men hoped they would
do or intended them to do . . . It is not stuffed but pregnant with meaning.
C. CURTIS, LIONS UNDER THE THRONE 2-3, 7-8 (1947).
55. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 387 (1975) (Burger, C. J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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Protestant theology. It is certainly significantly more consistent with the
Protestant world view of separation of secular and religious life than it is
with the older and still important tradition of religious observance as an
integral part of the life of the community. That traditional focus remains
a basic premise of religious experience for many Americans today and
cannot be ignored if the free exercise guarantee is to be honored in
substance as well as in form.
One form of "secularism" which peaked in the early twentieth century
with various attempts at coercive acculturation, 56 had antecedents
which, in retrospect, appear to have been thinly-veiled attempts to per-
petuate a Protestant world in spite of the heavy burden they placed upon
non-Protestant minorities. 7 Contemporary secularism still retains signif-
icant aspects of the earlier antireligious ideology of its predecessors. Its
self-image is that of the standardbearer of American democratic ideals
against the encroaching influences of religious institutions.58 There is
implicit in such an ideology the earlier anticlericism of the Reformation
and its ideological progeny, the Enlightenment.
One of the most perplexing issues in the earlier confrontations of the
nineteenth century over state aid to parochial schools is still with us
today. If tax money cannot be spent to aid institutions which teach
religious precepts, then ipso facto public schools must be purged of
religious influence. But if all religion is removed from the public school
curriculum, how will good morals be taught to children? 59 In the
nineteenth century some believed that moral education could imbue
children "with the 'fundamental tenets of duty which are the basis of all
religion, [without the influence of] sectarian or dogmatic teaching
1..' ",60 But others were not persuaded, remaining convinced that the
"morality" taught in the public schools was Protestantism in a univer-
salist disguise.
The drift towards an increasingly secularized society in the twentieth
century has been reflected in our public schools, to the extent that one
might legitimately question whether any conscious effort is given to the
56. Two excellent examples of such abortive attempts can be found in Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) and Myer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
57. The ideological polemics leading to the Blaine Amendment controversy in 1875-76
are illustrative of the earlier "secularism." For a discussion of this period, see E. SMITH,
supra note 36, ch. 6.
58. See, e.g., opinions of Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Fortas in Board of Educ.
v. Allen, 392 U.S. 253, 254-72 (1968).
59. See, e.g., Giannella, supra note 2.
60. Theodore Sedguick, Counsel to the Public School Society of New York, quoted in
E. Smith, supra note 36, at 112.
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"moral" education of children in American public schools. It would be
an oversimplification to suggest that the numerous signs of moral disin-
tegration in society are attributable to this failure of the public schools. It
is, nevertheless, equally insensitive to suggest that religious parents,
concerned about the moral as well as the religious education of their
children have no claim to public support. The rising crime rates among
juveniles and young adults, the increasing number of suicides among
teenagers, the high incidence of drug and alcohol use and addiction, and
the epidemic proportions of venereal disease among young adults are, to
some Americans, distressing signs of the total disintegration of a moral
order in American society. Many of these parents seek refuge in tradi-
tional religious education for their children. Although that may not be the
only reasonable response of concerned parents, it is clearly a rational
one. It is a response which deserves the support of the community unless
such support is a clear and direct violation of the rights of others in the
community. By the Court's own admission, the clear and unequivocal
language of the Constitution does not prohibit this support. Rather the
wording of the Constitution renders it imperative for the Court to con-
sider the injustice and inequality which may result from some of its
establishment clause decisions respecting financial assistance for the
secular education of children in religious institutions.
V. THE PARAMETERS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
A. Absolutist Rhetoric and Accommodation:
The Fundamental Inconsistency
In the first major discussion by the Supreme Court of the establish-
ment clause, Justice Black, in Everson v. Board of Education,6 an-
nounced the parameters for judicial interpretation:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amend-
ment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Gov-
ernment can set up a church. Neither can pass laws, which aid
one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or
remain away from church against his will or force him to profess
a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished
for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbelief s, for
church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount,
large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form
they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor
61. 330 U.S. I (1947).
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the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in
the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice
versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establish-
ment of religion was intended to erect "a wall of separation
between church and State."
62
The sweeping breadth of this statement is astonishing, especially when
one considers both the paucity of language in the first amendment 63 and
the narrow issue before the Court of the constitutionality of a New
Jersey enabling law and a local ordinance which together provided reim-
bursement to parents for actual expenses incurred for their children's
public transportation to public and parochial schools within the district.
A taxpayer challenged the payments made to parents of children attend-
ing parochial schools as violative of the establishment clause. The Su-
preme Court, per Justice Black, upheld the statute. In dissent, Justice
Jackson criticized the seemingly paradoxical nature of the majority's
analysis and its conclusion in observing that:
the undertones of the opinion, advocating complete and uncom-
promising separation of Church from State, seem utterly discor-
dant with its conclusion yielding support to their commingling in
educational matters. The case which irresistably comes to mind
as the most fitting precedent is that of Julia who, according to
Byron's reports, "whispering 'I will ne'er consent'-consent-
ed.,,64
The stage was thus set for a drama which played time and time again as
new cases involving the establishment clause came before the Court. On
one hand was the Court's absolutist rhetoric, and on the other was a
sense of a need for some form of practical accommodation of the diverse
interests within a pluralistic society. The tension between absolute prin-
62. Id. at 15-16.
63. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof .... ." U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1. The brevity of
the language has been the source of much of the Court's difficulty in interpreting it.
Although Justices have found more certainty in these clauses than others, a close reading
of the following passage from the opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in Zorach v. Clauson,
343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952) may shed doubt on just how clear those certainties are:
There cannot be the slightest doubt that the First Amendment reflects the philos-
ophy that Church and State should be separated. And so far as interference with
the "free exercise" of religion and an "establishment" of religion are concerned,
the separation must be complete and unequivocal. The First Amendment within
the scope of its coverage permits no exception; the prohibition is absolute. The
First Amendment, however, does not say that in every and all respects there shall
be a separation of Church and State. Rather, it studiously defines the manner, the
specific ways, in which there shall be no concert or union or dependency one on
the other [emphasis added].
64. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 19 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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ciples and political realities, implicit within any society, exists perhaps to
an unnecessary degree in the Court's establishment clause opinions. 65
One of the most perplexing aspects of Everson and subsequent cases is
total lack of confrontation between the basic assumptions underlying
both majority and minority opinions. Contrast, for example, the princi-
ple that neither federal nor state government may pass any law aiding
religion generally, with the clearer case of prohibiting aid to any particu-
lar religion. In light of a long tradition of tax exemptions for religious
property, deductions from personal income for donations to religious
organizations, and Sunday closing laws, some brief explanation of the
rationale behind this principle seems warranted. Such an explanation has
never been offered, although the Court has continually reasserted in
subsequent opinions its belief in the validity of its opposition to aiding
religion generally. This principle has been a major element in the Court's
nonestablishment rhetoric, figuring prominently in its analysis of various
establishment clause cases, although since Everson the Court has been
forced to acknowledge the existence of tax exemptions and Sunday
closing laws. In its analysis in these cases, the Court has, by and large,
been content to rely upon the longstanding nature of the practices and
secular goals each could be said to accomplish.66 It has never seriously
confronted the obvious fact that in spite of the secular purposes which
may be served by such laws, religious benefits are also derived from
them. The Court has therefore found no need to examine tax exemption
and Sunday closing laws vis-A-vis its continuing assertion that no aid, in
whatever form or amount, may be given to support religious institutions
and activities. Having recognized the legitimacy of such legislative ac-
commodation to religion, the Court could have attempted a reformula-
tion of its "no aid" rhetoric pursuant to the meaningful preservation of
the first amendment protection of free exercise. However, it has chosen
not to do so.
B. Aid to Religion v. Aid to Parents and Children:
An Uneasy Dichotomy
In Everson, Justice Black relied upon an analogy frequently recited by
the Court. He reasoned that in providing transportation for parochial
school children as well as public school children, the state is simply
65. See R. MCCLOSKY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 11-23 (1960).
66. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (property tax exemptions held
constitutional). See also Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Supermkt., 366 U.S. 617 (1961);
Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Two Guys v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Sunday closing laws, without exemptions for
Saturday Sabbath observers, held constitutional).
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furnishing the benefits of a public service to the whole community, not
unlike fire, police, and sanitation services. While all these services may
make it more likely that some parents might choose to send their children
to parochial school, such an eventuality is not within the ambit of the
"advancement" of religion forbidden by the establishment clause. "That
Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups
of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be
their adversary. State power is no more to be used so as to handicap
religions, than it is to favor them." '67
Additional support for the constitutionality of certain forms of aid to
families whose children attend parochial schools is found in Justice
Black's opinion in Everson. In it he asserts that "[t]he State contributes
no money to the schools. It does not support them. Its legislation, as
applied, does no more than provide a general program to help parents get
their children, regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to
and from accredited schools."6 This distinction between aid to religion
on the one hand and to parents and/or children on the other, as a
constitutionally significant fact reappeared in Board of Education v.
Allen,69 a case involving a state statute providing textbooks to all school
children.
In Allen, Justice White, writing for the Court, stated that:
The law merely makes available to all children the benefits of a
general program to lend school books free of charge. Books are
furnished at the request of the pupil and ownership remains, at
least technically, in the State. Thus no funds or books are
furnished to parochial schools, and the financial benefit is to
parents and children, not to schools. 70
While it is clear that Justice White relied upon the opinion of Justice
Black in Everson, it is informative to note that Justice Black dissented in
Allen. His language is particularly interesting in view of the fact that the
majority saw a close analogy between the bus fares in Everson and the
textbooks in Allen. Justice Black, however, saw no such connection and
stated in dissent, "I know of no prior opinion of this Court upon which
the majority here can rightfully rely to support its holding . . . . "7'
Clearly there are distinctions which can be drawn between buses and
textbooks, but none of these possible distinctions, without more, can
67. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
68. Id.
69. 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (citation omitted).
70. Id. at 243 (citation omitted).
71. Id. at 252 (emphasis added).
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serve to explain the intensity of Justice Black's dissent. This distinction
between aid to religion and aid to parents or children attending denomi-
national schools cannot withstand careful scrutiny. Religion is neither an
abstraction, nor some disembodied force in society with an existence
separate and apart from its adherents.72 Religion is a human enterprise.
Religious institutions are nothing more than associations of individuals
who share certain beliefs and who are engaged in a common pursuit.
What distinguishes religious groups from other voluntary associations in
the constitutional scheme is the additional recognition afforded religious
activity by the free exercise clause of the first amendment above and
beyond the general right of association encompassed within the extended
parameters of the first amendment. "Religion" is a term with broad and
shifting connotations. In its most pristine sense it refers to a body of
dogma generally elaborating the relationship between man and God.
Another common usage of the term connotes the whole panoply of
beliefs and practices generally associated with the active involvement of
individuals with a "religious" creed or dogma. In a perhaps more subjec-
tive sense, "religion" can mean simply the deeply held convictions of an
individual relative to either a particular brand of religious dogma or to his
personal relationship with the Almighty. There is yet another sense in
which the word "religion" is used which is closest to the prevailing
Supreme Court connotation, namely, referring to an organized religious
group such as the Catholic Church, the Mormon Church, or any other
religious organization.
The ambiguity in the meaning of "religion" adds another dimension of
uncertainty to the already vague concept of "no aid" to religion to which
the Court continually professes to adhere, in spite of its decisions
validating not only buses and books for parochial school students but
also Sunday closing laws and property tax exemptions for religious
organizations. Religion, in whatever sense it may be used, has no mean-
ingful existence apart from the people who profess, practice, and believe
in its tenets. Any "aid to religion" is therefore ipso facto an aid to
individuals and any aid to individuals in the pursuit of religious goals
must necessarily also be aid to religion in one or more of its commonly
accepted meanings.
72. This conception of religion is strangely analogous to a conception of law which
represents a dominant strand in Western legal thought. Both are seen as autonomous
entities without any inextricable relationship to their practitioners-as phenomena capa-
ble of independent existence and therefore cognizable without reference to their essential-
ly human dimension. But law and religion are human enterprises, unintelligible except in
relation to living, breathing, interacting human beings.
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C. Aid to Parents and Children: Inconsistency in
Applying the Standard
Assuming arguendo that the distinction between aid to religion and aid
to individuals can be sustained and could therefore support the Court's
decisions in Everson and Allen, it is difficult to reconcile the Court's
decision in PEARL v. Nyquist73 with these earlier decisions. In PEARL,
the Court invalidated a New York State scheme which provided either a
tuition reimbursement or a tax credit, depending upon income level, to
parents who paid private school tuition during the taxable year.74 In so
doing, Justice Powell, writing for the majority, said:
By reimbursing parents for a portion of their tuition bill, the
State seeks to relieve their financial burdens sufficiently to
assure that they continue to have the option to send their chil-
dren to religion-oriented schools. And while the other purposes
for that aid-to perpetuate a pluralistic educational environment
and to protect the fiscal integrity of over-burdened public
schools-are certainly unexceptionable, the effect of the aid is
unmistakably to provide desired financial support for nonpub-
lic, sectarian institutions.
To see any significant constitutional distinction between the busfares
in Everson, the textbooks in Allen, and the tuition grants/tax credits in
PEARL is to infuse the first amendment with quantitative rather than
qualitative distinctions. In each case, the parent is given financial relief
from the burdensome costs of parochial school education and the par-
ent's financial ability to choose a parochial school education for his child
is enhanced by the public contribution. In no instance is the parochial
school the direct recipient of the state aid. Nevertheless, the Court
concluded that in the tax credits/tuition reimbursement situation, "the
effect of the aid is unmistakably to provide desired financial support for
nonpublic, sectarian institutions." 76 In distinguishing Everson and Allen,
the Court emphasized that busing is an inherently nonreligious service
and that the books in Allen were specifically nonreligious in nature. With
respect to the tuition reimbursement and tax credit scheme, the Court
found no inherent or statutory criteria for assuring the nonreligious
73. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
74. The maximum amount of benefit was to be $50 per child for elementary school
students and $100 per student for high school students in any taxable year. In no event
could the amount of reimbursement exceed 50% of the actual tuition paid and tax credits
were available only to parents who paid at least $50 tuition during the taxable year. Id. at
764.
75. Id. at 783 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
76. Id.
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character of the benefit derived. "There has been," said the Court, "no
endeavor 'to guarantee the separation between secular and religious
educational functions and to ensure that State financial aid supports only
the former.' " The Court, in PEARL, considered irrelevant the fact
that the maximum possible state contribution to the education of any
parochial school student would not be more than 15% of total cost of that
student's education although all available evidence indicated that paroc-
hial schools spend substantially more than fifty per cent of the school
day, and presumably an equivalent per cent of the school dollar on
secular education. The Court reasoned that "[o]ur cases have long since
foreclosed the notion that mere statistical assurances will suffice to sail
between the Scylla and Charybdis of 'effect' and 'entanglement.' "78
Concern with the degree of the aid to religion ignores the distinction
upon which Everson and Allen relied-that the financial benefit inures to
the parents of school children and not to the religious institution and that
there is, therefore, no resulting aid to religion. The state-supported buses
which transport children to parochial schools carry them to their theolo-
gy lessons as well as to their biology labs, and the books loaned by the
state are utilized in what the Court has described on numerous occasions
as a "pervasively sectarian atmosphere." 79 It is difficult to perceive how
a more significant or more substantial aid to religion arises from the tax
credits or tuition reimbursements than from the busrides or books. For
constitutional purposes they seem analogous.
Another argument advanced by the Court in support of its willingness
to view the tuition reimbursements and tax credits as aid to religion
instead of as aid to parents deserves attention. The Court, responding to
the argument that the New York plan did not make parents mere
conduits for funds ultimately destined for the support of parochial
schools, stated that "[I]f the grants are offered as an incentive to
parents to send their children to sectarian schools by making unrestricted
cash payments to them, the Establishment Clause is violated whether or
not the actual dollars given eventually find their way into sectarian
77. Id. (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971)). But note that when
state statutes have attempted to segregate funds for strictly secular purposes, the Court
has rejected such laws because the supervision necessary to assure compliance runs afoul
of the Court's entanglement criteria. Such supervision would compromise the integrity of
religious institutions which the first amendment was designed to protect. See, e.g., Meek
v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
78. 413 U.S. at 787-88. It is noteworthy that the Court cited no previous cases when it
rejected the "long since foreclosed" notion that it might be possible to conceive of public
support for secular education in parochial schools without the ineluctable result that
religion in thereby "advanced."
79. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. at 371.
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institutions." 8" This contention, however, fails to raise a constitutionally
significant distinction between these payments and the benefits provided
in Everson or provided in Allen. The Court in PEARL apparently
recognized that in each of these cases the state aid makes it more likely
that some children will be able to attend parochial schools and that the
refusal of the state to provide the financial assistance in question would
presumably make it harder for some parents to elect religious schools in
lieu of public ones. But what the Court in PEARL apparently does not
accept is Justice Black's reminder in Everson that it is not the purpose of
the establishment clause to make such a choice more onerous than
necessary. 81
The criticism by the PEARL majority that the New York tax cred-
it/tuition reimbursement scheme provided an incentive to parents to send
their children to parochial schools is a double-edged sword. If partial
relief from tuition expenses constitutes an incentive to choose private
education, there exists a much greater incentive to reject private educa-
tion in favor of public education which will, of course, result in total
relief from educational expenses. It is revealing of the Court's concep-
tion of "neutrality" that the lesser incentive is seen as a violation of the
establishment clause whereas the far greater incentive to forsake reli-
gious for secular institutions is treated as "neutral" and without free
exercise implications.
D. Walz: Another Weak Link in PEARL
A second aspect of PEARL v. Nyquist presents an even more startling
example of the Court's failure to come to terms with earlier precedent or
continuing practices of both the states and the federal government.
Appellees, in support of the New York tax credit plan, argued that the
Court's earlier decision in Walz v. Tax Commission2 was strong prece-
dent in favor of the constitutionality of this form of tax relief. In Walz,
the issue presented was the validity of a state constitutional provision
which exempted "real or personal property used exclusively for reli-
gious, educational, or charitable purposes" 83 from taxation. The appel-
lant in Walz had argued that such exemptions violated the establishment
clause because the result was to require him to contribute indirectly to
religious institutions in violation of his right to be free from taxation for
religious purposes.' The Court, per Justice Burger, disagreed.
80. 413 U.S. at 786.
81. See text accompanying note 67 supra.
82. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
83. N.Y. STATE CONST. art. 16, § 1, quoted at 397 U.S. at 666-67.
84. 397 U.S. at 667.
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Chief Justice Burger upheld the New York property tax exemption,
citing the universality of such tax exemptions throughout the United
States 85 as well as the "ancient" character thereof. 86 Distinguishing
Walz, the PEARL Court noted that the New York tax credit scheme had
no historical antecedents,87 although it conceded that "historical accept-
ance without more would not alone have sufficed" 88 to validate an
otherwise objectionable law. This rationale for the Court's rejection of
Walz as controlling precedent in PEARL is not convincing. The Court
again emphasized the importance of a neutral posture toward religion in
order to give due respect to both free exercise rights and establishment
considerations. 89 "Special tax benefits, however, cannot be squared with
the principle of neutrality established by the decisions of this Court."'
These same "special tax benefits," however, were found to be
constitutionally permissible in Walz, and similar exemptions from feder-
al income taxation have been provided for by Congress since the enact-
ment of the first income tax law in 1913 following the adoption of the
sixteenth amendment. 9' The Court "distinguished" the Walz exemption
by saying that although it clearly conferred a benefit on religion, that
benefit was "an indirect and incidental one" 92 unlike the benefit pro-
vided by the New York scheme, the very "purpose and inevitable effect
[of which was] to aid and advance . ..religious institutions." 93 This
purported distinction is particularly curious. The "indirect and inciden-
tal" benefit in Walz resulted from total exemption from property taxa-
tion granted directly to churches, synagogues and other religious institu-
tions, while the direct and constitutionally offensive benefit in PEARL
results from a partial credit against state income tax granted to parents
who pay private school tuition for their children. This distinction seems
to distort reality and appears to have been designed only to evade earlier
precedent.
According to the PEARL majority, property tax exemptions are
motivated "not [by] any purpose to support or to subsidize, but [by the
desire to create] a fiscal relationship designed to minimize involvement
85. Id. at 676.
86. Id.
87. 413 U.S. at 792.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 793.
91. Act of Oct. 3, 1913, § II G(a), 39 Stat. 172. The present exemption is found in
I.R.C. §§ 501-09.
92. 413 U.S. at 793.
93. Id.
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and entanglement between Church and State." 94 Again, the Court con-
veniently ignored history and logic to suit its purpose. While the Walz
majority did discuss the importance of nonentanglement and the positive
contribution of tax exemptions in achieving this important goal, in no
way did this discussion alter the historical facts. From colonial times
churches have been exempt from taxation to relieve them of the financial
burden of taxation and to facilitate their vital participation in the intellec-
tual and spiritual life of the community. The nonentanglement standard
itself has no meaningful existence apart from its objective of preserving
the integrity of both institutions-the church and the state. The motiva-
tion for and inevitable effect of such tax exemptions must be seen as an
effort to "advance" both church and state, just as the motivation and
effect of the New York plan must be viewed as an effort to advance the
state's secular interest in quality education for all children as well as an
attempt to preserve free exercise rights of its citizens.
Other than in Mr. Justice Rehnquist's dissent, 95 no mention is made in
PEARL of a starkly analogous provision of the Internal Revenue Code
which provides a deduction to taxpayers for contribution to religious and
other charitable organizations, including all contributions made directly
to churches and synagogues for religious purposes.' It is unclear how
deductions for contributions directly to churches for religious purposes
can survive establishment clause scrutiny, while partial deductions for
tuition paid to parochial schools cannot.97
E. The Neutral Posture: An Emphasis on "Nonestablishment Values"
Another important theme in the Supreme Court's establishment clause
decisions is its concern with the maintenance of a neutral posture to-
wards religion by the state. The Court has insisted that the state take no
active role in the religious life of the people. Since the religion clauses
have been construed to protect nonbelievers as well as believers, any
state support for or encouragement of religious activity, although non-
denominational in nature, has been held to violate the establishment
clause.9" The purpose of that clause "was to assure that the national
94. Id.
95. Id. at 810 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
96. I.R.C. §§ 170, 2055, 2522.
97. The federal income tax deduction for contributions to churches and other charita-
ble institutions has not been challenged under the establishment clause.
98. Both prayer, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), and Bible reading, Abington
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1%3), in public schools have been held violative
of the establishment clause. There is, of course, a serious question about the nondenomi-
national character of any prayer or Bible reading but the Court recited the prayer as
nondenominational and nevertheless struck it down.
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legislature would not exert its power in the service of any purely religious
end . . . ." By virtue of incorporation, of course, the state legislatures
are similarly restricted.1° ° In upholding this aim of the establishment
clause, the Court has invalidated state laws requiring prayer in Engel v.
Vitale °10 and Bible reading in Abington School District v. Schempp. 102 In
both cases, the Court emphasized the importance of a "wholesome
neutrality" toward religion which the establishment clause was meant to
promote.
Governmental affirmation of the importance of religious belief or
activity, which implicitly exists when the state sanctions classroom pray-
ers or Bible reading, is thought to violate the establishment clause re-
gardless of the presence or absence of any compulsion which would
interfere with the free exercise rights of coerced individuals. In Engel,
the Court cautioned against confusing the establishment and free exer-
cise issues when it observed:
Although these two clauses may in certain instances overlap,
they forbid two quite different kinds of governmental encroach-
ment upon religious freedom. The Establishment Clause, unlike
the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any showing of
direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enact-
ment of laws which establish an official religion whether those
laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or
not. 103
However, it is clear from the trial record, as well as the briefs of
counsel, that the litigants in both Engel and Abington alleged a violation
of both the free exercise and establishment clauses. While the Supreme
Court may be correct in its suggestion that a violation of the establish-
ment clause may be found when there is no specific showing of a
concomitant denial of the right of free exercise in a particular case, the
Court's assertion that the two clauses "forbid two quite different kinds
of governmental encroachment upon religious freedom"' 1 4 is question-
able. In elaborating upon its position, the Court said that a primary
99. Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 234 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting McGo-
wan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 465-66 (1961)). Mr. Justice Brennan continued to quote
from Justice Frankfurter, as follows: "The Establishment Clause withdrew from the
sphere of legitimate legislative concern and competence a specific, but comprehensive,
area of human conduct: man's belief or disbelief in the verity of some transcendental idea
and man's expression in action of that belief or disbelief." 374 U.S. at 234.
100. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
101. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
102. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
103. 370 U.S. at 430.
104. Id.
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rationale for the existence of the establishment clause was the belief that
a union of government and religion would tend to destroy government
and degrade religion. 105 In support of this proposition the Court stated:
The history of governmentally established religion, both in Eng-
land and in this country, showed that whenever government had
allied itself with one particular form of religion, the inevitable
result had been that it had incurred the hatred, disrespect and
even contempt of those who held contrary beliefs. The same
history showed that many people had lost their respect for any
religion that had relied upon the support of government to
spread its faith. . . .Another purpose of the Establishment
Clause rested upon an awareness of the historical fact that
governmentally established religions and religious persecutions
go hand in hand. 106
The Court's evidence tends to support the suggestion that the religion
clauses of the first amendment do have a unifying theme-that the free
exercise of religion, including the right to disbelieve, is essential to the
continued viability of religion and that the prevention of established
religion is the singularly most important means of assuring that freedom.
Nonestablishment has little, if any, meaning apart from its importance as
a safeguard against coercion of the nonbeliever or the dissident believer
in religious matters. To argue that nonestablishment is an independent
goal worthy of constitutional sanctity is analogous to arguing that the
right of habeas corpus has independent significance apart from the
individual's freedom from unlawful restraint which it is meant to pre-
serve. Both may serve deep psychological needs as symbols of individual
freedom and governmental restraint, but that is hardly the independent
justification which the Court is suggesting in either of these cases or in
some of its later decisions regarding aid to children attending religious
schools. 07
Stripped of its free-exercise implications, the concept of a religiously
neutral secular democratic state presents a threat to the continued exis-
tence of religious institutions in the modem state. The ideology of the
liberal state rests upon a conception of an independent secular state, not
because of some inherent quality of transcendent significance in such a
105. Id. at 431.
106. Id. at 431-32 (emphasis added). Note that the Court cited only James Madison's
MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS (which may be found
in the appendix to Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. at 63-72) in support of its
historical interpretation.
107. See e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349(1975); PEARL v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973).
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state, but because the liberal state leaves the individual greater latitude
for the expression of his personality in the "private realm" from which
the state is excluded. The very purpose of constricting the scope of state
power is to expand the concomitant area of individual autonomy. To the
framers of the Constitution, religious freedom was one of the most
important aspects of that realm of private autonomy in which the indi-
vidual was to be protected from state interference. Accordingly, the right
of free exercise of religion is intimately bound up with the prohibition of
establishment.
As the Court has frequently noted, the right to free exercise, without
the parallel prohibition against establishment, would be tenuous and
perpetually uncertain. The converse, however, is clearly not the case.
Nonestablishment might well flourish without the restraint of the free
exercise clause, but religion would not. It is precisely the autonomous
character which the Supreme Court has recently given to the establish-
ment clause which presents the greatest threat to free exercise today.
The Court has distorted the first amendment by not only emphasizing the
independence of the establishment clause, but by elevating it to a posi-
tion of prominence in the scheme of first amendment values. While the
Court has refrained from expressing any direct preference for establish-
ment clause values over those of the free exercise clause, recently
decided cases support the conclusion that such a choice has indeed been
made. 108
F. "Indoctrination": A Variation on the Theme of Neutrality
A variation on the theme of governmental neutrality, which requires
that the government prefer no religious practice over any other or reli-
gion over nonreligion, is reflected in the Court's concern over govern-
ment support of religious "indoctrination." This concern became the
focal point for all three dissenting opinions in Board of Education v.
Allen 109 and is best summarized by Justice Douglas' terse language:
"[w]hatever may be said of Everson, there is nothing ideological about a
bus . . . .The textbook goes to the very heart of education. . . .It is
108. In its attempt to enhance the opportunities of the poor to choose between
public and nonpublic education, the State has taken a step which can only be
regarded as one "advancing" religion. However greai our sympathy for the
burdens experienced by those who must pay public school taxes at the same time
that they support other schools because of the constraints of "conscience and
discipline," and notwithstanding the "high social importance" of the State's
purposes, neither may justify an eroding of the limitations of the Establishment
Clause now firmly emplanted.
PEARL v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 788-89 (citations omitted).
109. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
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the chief, although not solitary, instrumentality for propagating a par-
ticular religious creed or faith." 110
The concept of "indoctrination" as it appears in the establishment
clause opinions of the Supreme Court is inextricably related to the
Court's failure to reconcile its conception of nonestablishment with
individual rights of free exercise. It is, after all, precisely because of the
free exercise rights of parents and children that parents must be permit-
ted to satisfy compulsory education requirements for their children by
sending them to parochial schools. I"' The argument that the constitution-
al basis for denying these children the benefits of public welfare legisla-
tion for educational purposes is that these children will be religiously
"indoctrinated" in the parochial schools in violation of the nonestablish-
ment principle requires serious scrutiny.
This so-called "indoctrination" is the very purpose for which reli-
giously motivated parents choose parochial over secular schools. It is, in
essence, that which the free exercise clause protects. How then can it be
constitutionally impermissible for a state to include parochial school
children within the operation of a statute designed to provide secular
educational benefits to all children, on the ground that the books will be
utilized within an environment which "indoctrinates" students with the
tenets of a particular faith, when that very "indoctrination" is protected
by the free exercise clause?
110. Id. at 257. See also note 197 infra.
I11. There is no precise holding on this issue. A strong argument can be made,
however, that the cases of Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), and Myer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), lead inevitably to
such a conclusion. In the latter two cases, the Court, faced with state compulsory
education laws, found that such statutes could not be used to eliminate nonpublic
schools--compulsory school attendance requirements could be satisfied by attendance at
either public or nonpublic schools. Although neither case can be said to have been decided
on first amendment grounds, it is interesting to note that, in his dissenting opinion in
Everson, Justice Rutledge, joined by three other justices, asserted that Pierce had been
decided on such grounds. 330 U.S. at 33.
Yoder represents, in a sense, a third dimension of the problem-in which the question
before the Court was not the right to send children to nonpublic schools in lieu of public
education, but the right to reject public education based upon a religious belief in no
"formal" education past a certain age (which was below that required by compulsory
education laws). The Court held that Jonas Yoder, a member of the Old Order of Amish
and other respondents similarly situated, entertained a sincere religious belief which
precluded compliance with the compulsory education laws of Wisconsin as applied to
children beyond the eighth. grade. The state's legitimate interest in promoting good
citizenship and assuring economically independent individuals, could not outweigh a
reasonable free exercise claim in these circumstances.
In light of the holdings in these three cases, it would seem frivolous to argue that parents
who send their children to parochial schools are not protected in doing so by the free
exercise clause.
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The presence of religious "indoctrination" in parochial schools has
been a major obstacle to equalization of state support of secular educa-
tion in public and parochial schools. The Court's position has been, in
essence, that as long as sectarian education continues in parochial
schools, any state assistance to those schools, no matter how secular and
independent of the religious function, nevertheless "advances" religion
in violation of the establishment prohibition. The Court has failed entire-
ly to consider the possible relevance of noncoercion in these cases. It has
denied that there may be any constitutionally significant difference be-
tween the religious "indoctrination" of public school students through
prayer or Bible reading in the public schools, and the religious "indoctri-
nation" of parochial students, at their parents behest, in parochial
schools which receive state support for the secular aspects of the
school's educational program. In the first case, an establishment clause
violation seems clear. The state, acting through its teacher-agents, is
performing a religious function. It thereby provides both financial sup-
port (however minimal) and, more importantly, official approval to that
religious activity. Regardless of its nondenominational character, such
official religious activity is certain to offend the nonbeliever or the
nonconforming believer. In the second case, however, nonbelievers and
nonconforming believers are not threatened by the religious activity. It is
performed in an atmosphere of willing participation. The state does not
engage in the religious activity; it is performed by agents of the church,
not those of the state. No financial support is provided since the state
support can be directed only at secular activities of the institution.
It is important to emphasize that private denominational schools pro-
vide secular education which is at least equal to the minimum standards
established by state boards of education. The work of the parochial
school is substantially secular-preparing young people for the respon-
sibilities of family, career, and community. To the extent that means can
be devised which will assure the continued vitality of the American
commitment to the separation of church and state, parochial schools
deserve community support.
G. The Vitality of the "Indoctrination" Principle:
Aid to Higher Education
The major factor distinguishing the cases dealing with state aid to
denominational colleges from those concerning aid to elementary and
secondary parochial schools appears to be the Court's perception of the
attenuated risk of indoctrination of students at the college level. This
perception rests upon essentially two ideas. First, the mission of the
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lower level parochial school is the religious education of young children,
while the primary function of the denominational college is to prepare
young men and women for professional careers in the secular world.
Secondly, the age and discretion of college students is such that they are
significantly less susceptible to indoctrination and therefore better able
to resist whatever attempts may, admittedly, be made to influence their
religious beliefs and practices. These ideas were articulated by Chief
Justice Burger in Tilton v. Richardson,'1 2 when he observed:
Since religious indoctrination is not a substantial purpose or
activity of these church-related colleges and universities, there
is less likelihood than in primary and secondary schools that
religion will permeate the area of secular education. This re-
duces the risk that government aid will in fact serve to support
religious activities."'
Hunt v. McNair"4 was the next of these cases to come before the
Court. The Court outlined criteria for determining what private educa-
tional activities may be supported by state funds. Hunt established that
"6no state aid at all [may] go to institutions that are so 'pervasively
sectarian' that secular activities cannot be separated from sectarian ones
and that if secular activities can be separated out, they alone may be
funded.""15 Having articulated these established criteria, the Court pro-
ceeded in Roemer v. Maryland"6 to approve noncategorical grants to
sectarian colleges." 7 In so doing it made an observation of critical
importance: "[a] system of government that makes itself felt as perva-
sively as ours could hardly be expected never to cross paths with the
church."" 8 It went on to say that "religious institutions need not be
112. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
113. Id. at 687.
114. 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
115. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 755 (1976).
116. 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
117. The Maryland statutory scheme challenged in Roemer provides funding for
"any private institution of higher learning within the State of Maryland," pro-
vided the institution is accredited by the State Department of Education...
maintains one or more "associate of arts or baccalaureate degree" programs, and
refrains from awarding "only seminarian or theological degrees." . . . [The
amount of aid received by each institution is] an amount equal to 15% of the
State's per-full-time-pupil appropriation for a student in the state college sys-
tem. . . . [A] recipient institution may put [the grants received] to whatever use
it prefers . . . . [provided that] "[n]one of the moneys [sic]. . . shall be utilized
by the institutions for sectarian purposes."
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quarantined from public benefits that are neutrally available to all."" 9
Nevertheless, many problems remain. For example, in its most recent
establishment clause decision, Wolman v. Walter,120 the Court, again
confronted with state aid to elementary and secondary parochial schools,
struck down several provisions because of the pervasively sectarian
nature of the educational environment and the impossibility of guaran-
teeing that state monies would not be used to promote sectarian ends.
This result was reached even though the provisions of the invalidated
statute called for the loan of "instructional materals and instructional
equipment of the kind in use in the public schools .. .and which is
'incapable of diversion to a religious use' ''121 as well as transportation
for field trips " 'as are provided to public school students' . 'to enrich
the secular studies of students.' ",122
In Roemer, however, the Court upheld the noncategorical grants to
sectarian colleges for secular purposes, despite the fact that evidence
was presented to the Court indicating that "[m]andatory religion or
theology courses are taught at each of the colleges. . . .[s]ome classes
are begun with prayer. . . some instructors wear clerical garb and
some classrooms have religious symbols."' 123 The Court affirmed the
trial court's conclusion that "[n]one of these facts impairs the clear and
convincing evidence that courses at each [institution] are taught 'accord-
ing to the academic requirements intrinsic to the subject matter and the
individual teacher's concept of professional standards.' "124
The anomalous result is that the establishment clause forbids a state
from sending public school personnel to a sectarian school to provide
auxiliary services such as remedial reading because of the "potential for
impermissible fostering of religion"' 25 or from transporting parochial
school children to a museum of natural history to study primitive culture
for the same reason, 126 although the same constitutional provision per-
mits noncategorical grants to sectarian colleges which require their stu-
dents to take courses in religion, even though some classes are begun by
prayer and some teachers wear clerical garb, because these colleges are
not "pervasively sectarian." 27 Not only does the Court's indoctrination
119. Id. at 746.
120. 433 U.S. 229 (1977). See text accompanying notes 156-175 infra.
121. Id. at 248.
122. Id. at 252.
123. 426 U.S. at 756.
124. Id. at 756-57.
125. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. at 369.
126. See 426 U.S. at 762.
127. Id. at 756-59.
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principle mistakenly perceive the free exercise aspect of the issue, but
the Court has demonstrated a startling inability to apply its own principle
with either clarity or consistency.
H. The Potential for Inadvertant Fostering of Religion:
Meek v. Pittenger
While textbooks and busing programs have survived establishment
clause challenges, other state programs of a public-welfare nature have
not. In Meek v. Pittenger, 2 ' the Court upheld the textbook provisions of
the statutes presented for review, but invalidated other provisions which
in principle appear indistinguishable from textbook programs.
The provisions of the Pennsylvania statute declared unconstitutional
in Meek fell into two categories. The first provided "auxiliary services,"
including "counseling, testing, and psychological services, speech and
hearing therapy, teaching and related services for exceptional children,
for remedial students, and for the educationally disadvantaged.' 129 All
such services were to be rendered on the private school premises by
public school personnel paid by and subject to the control of the state
board of education. The second major category of aid provided for
loans, upon request, of certain "instructional materials and equipment"
including books, periodicals, photographs, maps, charts, globes, sound
recordings, slides, films, video tapes, recording and projection equip-
ment, and laboratory equipment. Any such materials were required to be
secular, neutral, and nonideological.130
The Court, per Justice Stewart, began its discussion of the problems
presented by the case by articulating a three-part test culled from prior
opinions: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose.
Second, it must have a 'primary effect' that neither advances nor inhibits
religion. Third, the statute and its administration must avoid excessive
government entanglement with religion."31 Justice Stewart observed by
way of a caveat that "[i]t is well to emphasize, however, that the tests
must not be viewed as setting the precise limits to the necessary constitu-
tional inquiry, but serve only as guidelines with which to identify in-
stances in which the objectives of the Establishment Clause have been
impaired.' 1 32
128. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
129. Id. at 352-53..
130. Id. at 354-55.
131. Id. at 358 (citations omitted).
132. Id. at 358-59.
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The decision continues with the following juxtaposition of concepts,
revealing the Supreme Court's dilemma in its adjudication of establish-
ment clause controversies. A quotation from Justice Black's seminal
opinion in Everson, "[nlo tax in any amount, large or small, can be
levied to support any religious activities or institutions . . ."133 is fol-
lowed by the observation that "not all legislative programs that provide
indirect or incidental benefit to a religious institution are prohibited by
the Constitution." t 34 And finally, there is the recognition of the need for
prudential judgment: "The problem, like many problems in constitution-
al law, is one of degree.' 1 35 That last simple phrase, "the problem is one
of degree," generates a host of fundamental questions, not the least of
which is the scope of judicial power vis-A-vis legislative prerogatives, an
issue heightened in these cases by the implications one may wish to draw
from the "federalism issue" lurking in any fourteenth amendment incor-
porationist decision.
The Court's decision in Meek, invalidating the state plan to lend
instructional materials, rested upon the conclusion that in spite of its
valid secular purpose,' 36 "the direct loan of instructional material and
equipment ha[d] the unconstitutional primary effect of advancing reli-
gion because of the predominantly religious character of the schools
benefiting from the Act.' 1 37 The Court acknowledged "that as part of
general legislation made available to all students, a State may include
church-related schools in programs providing bus transportation, school
lunches, and public health facilities-secular and nonideological services
unrelated to the primary, religion-oriented educational function of the
sectarian school.' 138 The distinction between these constitutionally per-
missible programs and the Pennsylvania plan at issue in Meek was said to
be that the other programs provided merely "indirect and incidental
benefits to church-related schools," whereas the Meek plan provided
133. Id. at 359 (quoting 330 U.S. at 16).
134. 421 U.S. at 359.
135. Id. (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952)).
136. The Act was "accompanied by legislative findings that the welfare of the
Commonwealth requires that present and future generations of schoolchildren be assured
ample opportunity to develop their intellectual capacities." The statute was "intended to
further that objective by extending'the benefits of free educational aids to every school-
child in the Commonwealth, including nonpublic school students who constitute approxi-
mately one quarter of the schoolchildren in Pennsylvania." 421 U.S. at 363.
137. "[O]f the 1,320 nonpublic schools in Pennsylvania that ... qualify for aid under
[the] Act . . . , more than 75% are church-related or religiously affiliated educational
institutions." 421 U.S. 349, 364 (1975).
138. Id. at 364.
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"massive aid" which was thought to be "neither indirect nor inci-
dental.'" 39
The Court's reasoning, however, is not convincing for there is no
constitutional basis for drawing a distinction between the text books
approved in Allen and the equipment rejected in Meek. Rather the Court
appears to be exercising its prudential judgment in opposition to that of
the state legislature.
L Scylla and Charybdis: Effect and Entanglement
To appreciate the full significance of Meek v. Pittenger, one must
understand several other recent Supreme Court decisions. In Lemon v.
Kurtzman,140 decided with two other cases,141 the Supreme Court reject-
ed an attempt by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to enact legislation
providing economic assistance to parochial schools in aid of the secular
function performed therein. 42 The statutory scheme in Lemon au-
thorized contracts between the state board of education and nonpublic
schools for the "purchase" of certain enumerated secular services. 143
The state's objective was to provide at least a partially free secular
education to children whose parents elected to send them to nonpublic
schools.
The Supreme Court rejected this plan and a similar one enacted by
Rhode Island on the ground that, although both states had sought to
segregate their contributions to the nonpublic schools to avoid the
constitutionally impermissible "advancement of religion,"' 4 the states
139. Id. at 364-65.
140. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
141. Earley v. DiCenso and Robinson v. DiCenso, sub. nom. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971).
142. The Pennsylvania Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Education Act was
passed in 1%8 in response to a crisis that the Pennsylvania Legislature found
existed in the State's nonpublic schools due to rapidly rising costs. The statute
affirmatively reflects the legislative conclusion that the State's educational goals
could appropriately be fulfilled by government support of "those purely secular
educational objectives achieved through nonpublic education .
403 U.S. at 609 (citation omitted).
143. "The statute authorizes [the] state Superintendent of Public Instruction to 'pur-
chase' specified 'secular educational services' from nonpublic schools. Under the
'contracts' authorized by the statute, the State directly reimburses nonpublic schools
solely for their actual expenditures for teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instructional
materials." Id.
144. "The two legislatures ... [recognizing] that church-related . . . schools have a
significant religious mission ...have therefore sought to create statutory restrictions
designed to guarantee the separation between secular and religious educational functions
and to ensure that State financial aid supports only the former." Id. at 613.
[Vol. 27:207
Eclipse of Free Exercise Values
had thereby fallen into the equally abhorrent trap of "entanglement." 45
This vice has a double aspect, the Court explained; "[a]s well as
constituting an independent evil against which the Religion Clauses were
intended to protect, involvement or entanglement between government
and religion serves as a warning signal."'146
In analyzing these programs, the Court emphasized the need for
continuous supervision to ensure that state funds would be used solely
for secular purposes. 47 A major problem cited by the Court in Lemon
was reliance on the good faith efforts of parochial school teachers to
maintain the required separation between the secular and religious as-
pects of the educational process: "We do not assume . . .that paro-
chial school teachers will be unsuccessful in their attempts to segregate
their religious beliefs from their secular education responsibilities. But
the potential for impermissible fostering of religion is present."'"
It is obvious that the Pennsylvania legislature drafted the statutes
invalidated in Meek in direct response to the Court's opinion in Lemon.
In so doing, the legislature sought to develop a program of aid which
would avoid the direct grant problems of Lemon. The Meek scheme
involved two forms of aid: the educational equipment and materials were
provided to nonpublic schools on a loan basis from the state, following
the example of previously approved textbook loan programs, and the
auxiliary services program was to be admininstered by the state itself and
was to employ only state personnel. 49 These arrangements were obvi-
ously intended to avoid both the problem of direct grants to the nonpub-
lic schools and the reliance upon parochial school employees to adminis-
ter the secular services funded by the state, a major concern expressed
by the Court in Lemon. " Presumably the legislature thought that this
would avoid the necessity of "comprehensive, discriminating, and
continuing state surveillance"'' to ensure the integrity of the secular
purposes of the program.
Although the new scheme was designed to avoid "the Scylla and
Charybdis of 'effect' and 'entanglement' "152 the Court nevertheless held
145. -[T]he cumulative impact of the entire relationship arising under the statutes in
each State involves excessive entanglement between government and religion." Id. at
614.
146. Id. at 624-25.
147. "A comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance will inevit-
ably be required to ensure that these restrictions are obeyed and the First Amendment
otherwise respected." Id. at 619.
148. Id.
149. See 421 U.S. at 351-55.
150. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
151. Id.
152. PEARL v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 788.
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in Meek that such a program did create "a serious potential for divisive
conflict over the issue of aid to religion-'entanglement in the broader
sense of continuing political strife.' "113 In support of this proposition,
the Court pointed to the "recurrent nature of the appropriation process
[which would] guarantee annual reconsideration of [the Act]. .... "151 It
is appropriate to question why the alleged potential for political conflict
makes this program unconstitutional, whereas programs such as those
approved in Everson and Allen have apparently caused little, if any,
political divisiveness over the years although requiring annual ap-
propriations. Ironically, the Court sees no danger of political divisive-
ness in its continuing invalidation of the acts of state legislatures, which
represent thoughtful choices born of the give and take of legislative
compromise aimed at accommodating diverse groups in a pluralistic
society. 155
Lemon v. Kurtzman, PEARL v. Nyquist, and Meek v. Pittenger de-
livered a clear message. Carefully restricted grants of aid for secular
nonideological equipment and services performed in nonpublic schools,
whether by public or nonpublic school personnel, violate the establish-
ment clause because they create an excessive entanglement between
church and state and carry a potential for fostering religion and promot-
ing political divisiveness. Nonrestricted indirect grants to parents of
children attending parochial schools violate the establishment clause
because in failing to restrict the use of such grants to secular education,
they necessarily have the effect of advancing religion. It has become
increasingly obvious that the standards imposed upon state legislation by
the Court constitute a serious obstacle in the search for a remedy for the
fiscal problems which beset parochial education today.
J. Devising a Remedy: Wolman v. Walter
State legislatures have demonstrated considerable tenacity in their
continuing battle with the Supreme Court over programs of aid to paro-
chial schools. The latest round in this contest, Wolman v. Walter,156
represents both a victory for persistence and a retrenchment for resist-
ance. The Ohio legislature, aware of the result in Meek, enacted a statute
providing various types of aid to private elementary and secondary
153. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. at 372.
154. Id.
155. At least one member of the Court does see such a threat. "I see at least as much
potential for divisive political debate in opposition to the crabbed attitude the Court shows
in this case." Id. at 386 (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
156. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
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schools. Four of the six forms of aid reviewed by the Court in this case
were upheld; the other two were struck down, although a considerable
effort of judicial calculus is required to sort out these results. 15 7
In the end, six justices agreed that textbook loans to students in
parochial schools are still constitutionally permissible, although for the
first time several dissenters argued that Allen' 58 should be overruled. 159
The section of the Ohio statute authorizing the expenditures "[tlo supply
for use by pupils attending nonpublic schools . . . such standardized
tests and scoring services as are used in the public schools of the
State"' 6 was also supported by six justices. An earlier case, Levitt v.
Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty 161 was distinguished
on the ground that the specific constitutional infirmity in Levitt, that
there was no available means "to assure that internally prepared tests are
free of religious instruction,"' 162 had been cured under the Ohio scheme
because "[t]he nonpublic school does not control the content of :the test
or its result. This serves to prevent the use of the test as a part of
religious teaching, and thus avoids that kind of direct aid to religion
found present in Levitt . . . [and] eliminates the need for the supervision
that gives rise to excessive entanglement."
63
The real success of the Ohio effort to aid parochial school students,
however, came with the approval of two provisions of the statute au-
thorizing diagnostic' 16 and therapeutic' 65 services. Since the Court had
157. For some idea of the nightmare which the members of Court created, reproduced
below is the final paragraph from a syllabus to the Court's opinion in Wolman.
BLACKMUN, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of
the Court with respect to Parts I, V, VI, VII, and VIII, in which STEWART and
STEVENS, J.J., joined; in which as to Part I, BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN,
MARSHALL, and POWELL, J.J., also joined; in which as to Part V, BURGER, C.J.,
and MARSHALL and POWELL, J.J., also joined; in which as to Part VI BUR-
GER, C.J., and POWELL, J., also joined; in which as to Parts VII and VIII,
BRENNAN and MARSHALL, J.J., also joined; and an opinion in which as to Parts
II, III, and IV, BURGER, C.J., and STEWART and POWELL, J.J., joined. BURGER,
C.J., dissented from Parts VII and VIII. BRENNAN, J ... MARSHALL, J ...
and STEVENS, J ... filed opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part.
POWELL, J., filed an opinion concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting in part. . . . WHITE and REHNQUIST, J.J., filed a statement
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part ...
Id. at 231-32.
158. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
159. See opinions of Mr. Justice Marshall, 433 U.S. at 256-62; and Mr. Justice Stevens,
id. at 264-66.
160. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.06(J) (Supp. 1976).
161. 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
162. Id. at 480, quoted in Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. at 239.
163. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. at 240-41.
164. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.06(D), (F) (Supp. 1976).
165. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.06(G), (1), (K) (Supp. 1976).
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invalidated similar programs two terms earlier in Meek v. pittenger,166
this success was indeed surprising. With respect to diagnostic services,
the Court noted that it invalidated the portion of the Pennsylvania statute
in Meek which authorized such services "only because it was found
unseverable from the unconstitutional portions of the statute.' 1 67 The
Court also recalled that it had emphasized that such services seemed "to
fall within that class of general welfare services for children that may be
provided by the State regardless of the incidental benefit that accrues to
church-related schools."'6 It was not, therefore, terribly surprising that
the Court upheld this portion of the Ohio Code.
The fate of the therapeutic services, however, was a surprise. In Meek
the Court had found that personnel engaged in therapeutic services,
which, unlike diagnostic ones, tend to be based upon a continuing rela-
tionship between the therapist and the student, were actually in a posi-
tion to transmit ideological views. Therefore, a danger arose that pres-
sure from the pervasively sectarian atmosphere of the church-related
school might cause even public school personnel to inadvertently foster
religious beliefs. The Ohio legislature, conversant with the decision in
Meek, provided for therapeutic services to be rendered by public school
personnel either on public school premises, in public centers, or in
mobile units located off the nonpublic school premises. The Supreme
Court found that the therapeutic services "are to be offered under
circumstances that reflect their religious neutrality," and therefore, "the
danger perceived in Meek does not arise."' 169
The Ohio legislature's attempt to provide instructional materials, how-
ever, was unsuccessful. 70 Following the precedent of Allen in which
textbooks loaned directly to nonpublic school students were approved,
the Ohio legislature sought to provide other instructional materials and
equipment via a loan system to students or their parents. This, it was
believed, would overcome the hurdle of aid to the sectarian school
enterprise as a whole found fatal to the similar statutory scheme of
Meek. The Supreme Court was not persuaded, stating that "it would
exalt form over substance if this distinction were found to justify a result
different from that in Meek.' 7' The Court went on to point out that the
166. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
167. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. at 244.
168. Id. at 243 (quoting from Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. at 371 n.21).
169. Id. at 247.
170. The Court also struck down the section of the Ohio Code which authorized field
trip transportation. Id. at 255.
171. Id. at 250.
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real infirmity arose because of the "impossibility of separating the secu-
lar education function from the sectarian" which means that any state
aid in support of the educational function of the parochial schools "in-
evitably flows in part in support of the religious role of the schools."' 172
The opinion for the Court, written by Mr. Justice Blackmun, does not
explain why a test tube is different in this respect from a textbook. Some
of the dissenting and concurring Justices argued that there was no
constitutional difference between the two, but, unfortunately, some of
them would hold both bus rides and textbooks unconstitutional.173
The Court never explained why state aid to provide loans of textbooks
and bus transportation for children attending parochial schools does not
have the same "primary effect of aiding religion.' ' 74 The same bus
carrying the child to his science laboratory also carries him to his religion
class and the secular textbooks, no more and no less than the secular
maps and secular test tubes, are used in an educational environment "in
which religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions
are subsumed in the religious mission.''175 What principle distinguishes
one case from the other? The best indication from the language quoted
above is that no principle is involved. The Court has merely made a
prudential judgment that some aid is permissible but too much is uncon-
stitutional.
Logical inconsistency, however, is merely the product of a more
fundamental problem-the Court's insistence upon a rigid conception of
separation at the expense of free exercise values. The necessary conse-
quence of these decisions is that free secular education is available to
some only if they are willing to forego their right to choose an integrated
secular and religious education in accordance with their religious beliefs.
K. "Purpose and Effect": Down the Garden
Path to Unconstitutionality
What began with the Everson decision as a commitment to neutrality
in the relations of church and state under the establishment clause ' 76 has
172. Id.
173. Justice Marshall went so far as to opine that "Allen is largely responsible for
reducing the 'high and impregnable' wall between church and state erected by the First
Amendment." Id. at 257.
174. d. at 242.
175. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 366 (1975) (quoting from Hunt v. McNair, 413
U.S. 734, 743 (1973)).
176. "[The first a]mendment requires the State to be a neutral in its relations with
groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their
adversary. State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor
them." Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
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evolved into an apologetic hostility to religious groups seeking substan-
tive realization of the right to free exercise. 177 The explanation for much
of this must remain in the recesses of the judicial minds that shaped the
parameters of the establishment clause in the intervening years. Time
and again the conceptual apparatus which appeared to promise an even-
handed analysis of church-state relationships has been perverted into a
weapon- against non-Protestant believers. The very concept of "neu-
trality" has led to decidedly nonneutral results, an outstanding example
of which is to be found in the Sunday closing law cases.178
In McGowan v. Maryland, 179 Justice Frankfurter suggested a mode of
analysis which seemed to promise a balanced approach. There he stated:
These regulations may fall afoul of the Constitutional guarantee
against infringement of the free exercise or observance of reli-
gion. Where they do, they must be set aside at the instance of
those whose faith they prejudice. But once it is determined that
a challenged statute is supportable as implementing other sub-
stantial interests than the promotion of belief, the guarantee
prohibiting religious "establishment" is satisfied. 18°
Justice Frankfurter agreed with the majority that contemporary Sunday
closing laws, whatever their historical origins, promote substantially
secular interests and that, regardless of the incidental benefit to religion,
such laws are constitutional under the establishment clause.' 8'
In a companion case, Braunfeld v. Brown, 8 2 in which an Orthodox
Jewish merchant demonstrated that the Sunday closing laws caused him
severe financial hardship because they did not exempt Saturday Sabbath
observers, Justice Frankfurter was not persuaded by his own caveat
respecting potential threats to free exercise." 3 The majority were simi-
larly unmoved,"I although the Justices dissenting in each of the cases
discussed the discriminatory treatment afforded Sabbatarians by the
Court's analysis.' 8 5
177. However great our sympathy for the burdens experienced by those who must
pay public school taxes at the same time that they support other schools because
of the constraints of 'conscience and discipline' and notwithstanding the 'high
social importance' of the State's purposes, neither may justify an eroding of the
limitations of the Establishment Clause now firmly emplanted [sic].
PEARL v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788-89 (1973) (citations omitted).
178. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) and its companion cases.
179. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
180. Id. at 466 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
181. Id. at 504-05.
182. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
183. Id. at 610.
184. Id. at 605-06.
185. If the "free exercise" of religion were subject to reasonable regulations . ..
or if all laws "respecting the establishment of religion" were not proscribed, I
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Two years after McGowan, the language of Justice Frankfurther,
quoted above, was transformed into one of the major criteria to be used
by the Court in subsequent establishment clause cases. In Abington v.
Schempp, 186 Justice Clark, writing for the majority, stated the "test" as
follows:
[W]hat are the purpose and the primary effect of the enactment?
If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the
enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as cir-
cumscribed by the Constitution. That is to say that to withstand
the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secu-
lar legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither ad-
vances nor inhibits religion.'8 7
One might reasonably have expected the Court to apply this test in
subsequent cases in a manner consistent with the Court's approach to the
Sunday closing law cases. In these cases, the Court, recognizing the
legitimate secular goals sought by Sunday closing laws, refused to invali-
date them under the establishment clause although a religious benefit
was also derived from them. This benefit was thought to be incidental to
the otherwise valid legislative objectives in spite of clear historical evi-
dence of religious motivation for such legislation throughout much of its
existence.'8 The majority, in upholding the Sunday closing laws,
could understand how rational men, representing a predominantly Christian
civilization, might think these Sunday laws did not unreasonably interfere with
anyone's free exercise of religion and took no step toward a burdensome estab-
lishment of any religion.
I do not see how a State can make protesting citizens refrain from doing
innocent acts on Sunday because the doing of those acts offends sentiments of
their Christian neighbors.
366 U.S. 420, 561-62 (Douglas, J., dissenting). "[Tihe issue in this case... is whether a
State may put an individual to a choice between his business and his religion. The Court
today holds that it may. But I dissent, believing that such a law prohibits the free exercise
of religion." 366 U.S. 599, 611 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). "Pennsylvania
has passed a law which compels an Orthodox Jew to choose between his religious faith
and his economic survival. That is a cruel choice. It is a choicewhich I think no State can
constitutionally demand." 366 U.S. 599, 616 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
186. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
187. Id. at 222.
188. Clear evidence of religious purpose (at least of the historical variety) can be
gainsaid from the language of the very laws at issue in McGowan v. Maryland. See, e.g.,
MD. ANN. CODE, art. 27 "Sabbath Breaking":
§492. Working on Sunday; permitting children or servants to game, fish, hunt,
etc.-No person whatsoever shall work or do any bodily labor on the Lord's day,
commonly called Sunday; and no person having children or servants shall
command, or wittingly or willingly suffer any of them to do any manner of work
or labor on the Lord's day (works of necessity and charity always excepted), nor
shall suffer or permit any children or servants to profane the Lord's day by
gaming, fishing, fowling, hunting or unlawful pastime or recreation. . ..
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showed little or no concern with the incidental but obvious benefit to the
Christian religion derived from the promotion of an atmosphere condu-
cive to religious observance. Even the dissenters, excepting Justice
Douglas,' 89 showed little concern for the establishment aspects of these
laws, contenting themselves with an analysis of the resulting interference
with the free exercise rights of Sabbatarians.190
It was, therefore, somewhat paradoxical to hear the Supreme Court,
per Justice Powell, characterize New York's tax credit, tuition reim-
bursement plan in PEARL v. Nyquist 91 in the following language:
[W]hile the other purposes for that aid-to perpetrate a plural-
istic educational environment and to protect the fiscal integrity
of overburdened public schools-are certainly unexceptionable,
the effect of the aid is unmistakably to provide desired financial
support for nonpublic, sectarian institutions. In its attempt to
enhance the opportunities of the poor to choose between public
and nonpublic education, the State has taken a step which can
only be regarded as one "advancing" religion.' 92
Justice Powell's footnote thirty-nine is even more astonishing. In
answer to criticism from fellow justices that he had ignored the immense-
ly significant modifier "primary" in the purpose and effect test, he said:
Our cases simply do not support the notion that a law found to
have a "primary" effect to promote some legitimate end under
the State's police power is immune from further examination to
ascertain whether it also has the direct and immediate effect of
advancing religion. In McGowan v. Maryland, Sunday Closing
Laws were upheld, not because their effect was, first, to pro-
mote the legitimate interest in a universal day of rest and recrea-
tion and only secondarily to assist religious interests; instead,
approval flowed from the finding, based upon a close examina-
Compare this with the original Biblical injunction:
Remember the sabbath day, to keep it holy. Six days shalt thou labour, and do all
thy work; but the seventh day is a sabbath unto the LORD thy God, in it thou
shalt not do any manner of work, thou, nor thy son, nor thy daughter, nor thy
man-servant, nor thy maid-servant, nor thy cattle, nor thy stranger that is within
thy gates; for in six days the LORD made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that is
in them, and rested on the seventh day; wherefore the LORD blessed the sabbath
day, and hallowed it.
EXODUS 20:8-11 (THE HOLY SCRIPTURES according to the Masoretic Text).
189. Justice Douglas' opinion in McGowan expresses concern with both establishment
and free exercise clause violations. 366 U.S. at 524 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
190. Both Justice Stewart and Justice Brennan expressed the opinion that the Sunday
closing laws without exemptions for Sabbatarians violated their rights to the free exercise
of religion. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 610 (1961).
191. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
192. Id. at 783, 788.
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tion of the history of such laws, that they had only a remote and
incidental effect advantageous to religious institutions. 93
Rhetoric is a weapon against which analytic skills pale, but it does
seem obvious that the Court's application of the "purpose and effect"
analysis in PEARL is discordant with its application to the Sunday
closing law cases. In the latter cases, the test was applied benignly in the
face of religiously ladened statutory language and a history of religious,
as well as secular, purpose and effect. In PEARL, 194 Meek, 195 and
Wolman,' 96 the test was used with the exactitude of a Geiger counter
attuned to the presence of even the slightest possibility of a religious
benefit.
The decisions of the Supreme Court in this sensitive area of church
and state, as outlined above, suggest the possibility of nonconstitutional
factors at work. The blatant inconsistencies in the application of the
Court's own standards of decision are veiled only by the Court's continu-
ing reliance upon rhetoric and the convenient, but selective, use of
history to suit its purposes. The result, not surprisingly, has been the
perpetuation of a Protestant conception of religion and the scope of its
protection due under the first amendment.
V. SOME REFLECTIONS ON RELIGION, DEMOCRACY, FEDERALISM,
JUDICIAL REVIEW, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Perhaps the most fundamental tension implicit in the religion clauses
of the first amendment is derived from the Court's interpretation that the
establishment clause mandates not only a separation of church and state
in the political and administrative sense, but also in the sense of creating
an inviolable separation between civil society and the religious realm.' 97
193. Id. at 783-84 n.39 (citations omitted).
194. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
195. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
196. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
197. Justice Rutledge, joined by Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, and Burton, dissenting
in Everson v. Board of Educ. put it as follows:
The [first a]mendment's purpose was not to strike merely at the official establish-
ment of a single sect, creed, or religion, outlawing only a formal relation such as
had prevailed in England and some of the colonies. Necessarily it was to uproot
all such relationships. But the object was broader than separating church and
state in this narrow sense. It was to create a complete and permanent separation
of the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbid-
ding every form of public aid or support for religion.
330 U.S. at 31-32.
Another expression of this concept of total separation, which originated with Roger
Williams, was used by Justice Black for the majority in Everson: "[T]he clause against
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect a 'wall of separation between
church and State.' " Id. at 16.
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Under this interpretation, the two spheres of activity are to be clearly
delineated and any interference of one with the other forbidden. But, of
course, the first amendment also contains a free exercise clause, to
protect the individual believer in the observance of the tenets of his or
her faith. The Court's interpretation of the establishment clause so as to
provide maximal separation must implicitly presuppose that the guaran-
tee of free exercise can nevertheless be fully accommodated within such
a universe, unless we are to understand the Court as saying that absolute
separation is of the essence, although full realization of the free exercise
mandate may thereby be compromised.
The idea that the guarantee of free exercise can be fully realized, in
spite of a conception of total separation under the establishment clause,
rests upon an essentially Protestant conception of religion and its proper
role in the affairs of men. That is to say, religion can and should be
separate from political and economic life.198 This view excludes
religion as "divisive" or as separated by constitutional fiat from
the common and public arena, thereby subordinating religious
affirmation to a superior civic faith. One encounters rather
often the attitude that the "creeds" or "sects" are peripheral
and private and of only individual or family significance; they
should not "meddle" in the public arena. The real faith of
society is "democracy" to which some may add a subordinate
private religious creed if they want to. 199
This characteristic posture of American Protestantism is, however,
not universally shared by other faiths. To some believers, "[s]uch a point
of view is naturally offensive . . . for it misunderstands the necessarily
transcendent and all encompassing relevance of religion.' 2oo To such an
individual the total separation of faith from the experience of everyday
198. Justice Jackson, dissenting in Everson, frankly acknowledged this ideology and
its relationship to the rise of public education in the United States when he said:
Our public school, if not a product of Protestantism, at least is more consistent
with it than with the Catholic culture and scheme of values. It is a relatively
recent development dating from about 1840. It is organized on the premise that
secular education can be isolated from all religious teaching so that the school can
inculcate all needed temporal knowledge and also maintain a strict and lofty
neutrality as to religion. The assumption is that after the individual has been
instructed in worldly wisdom he will be better fitted to choose his religion.
Whether such a disjunction is possible, and if possible whether it is wise, are
questions I need not try to answer.
330 U.S. at 23-24 (footnote omitted).
199. W. MILLER, RELIGION AND THE FREE SOCIETY 13 (1958) (Fund for the Republic
Pamphlet).
200. Id. at 13.
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life is impossible. His religious universe is not separable, indeed its
essence is its nonseparability from the totality of human experience.2 10
How then can the free exercise rights of the dissident believer, the
non-Protestant, which by their very nature require integration of civil
and religious spheres be reconciled with an establishment clause in-
terpretation which demands their absolute separation? The plain answer
is that they are irreconcilable. The fanciest rhetorical footwork cannot
overcome this difficulty. The recurrent emergence of this fundamental
tension in numerous cases before the Court and the Court's failure to
address the issue directly leads inevitably to an alternative explanation
that: in spite of the interference with the free exercise rights of certain
religious minorities, absolute separation of church and state-or the
closest approximation the Court can reach-must be the overriding
concern. 
202
Perhaps the most revealing and at the same time the most frustrating
aspect of this problem is the Court's failure to deal explicitly with the
apparent conflict. To do so would require the Court to make a difficult
decision. It might have to decide that its interpretation of the establish-
ment clause was erroneous or that it had outlived its usefulness and was
201. Justice Jackson also saw this problem clearly when he observed that:
The Roman Catholic Church, counseled by experience in many ages and many
lands and with all sorts and conditions of men, takes what, from the viewpoint of
its own progress and the success of its mission, is a wise estimate of the
importance of education in religion. It does not leave the individual to pick up
religion by chance. It relies on early and indelible indoctrination in the faith and
order of the Church by the word and example of persons consecrated to the task.
I should be surprised if any Catholic would deny that the parochial school is a
vital, if not the most vital, part of the Roman Catholic Church. . . . Catholic
education is the rock on which the whole structure rests ....
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. at 23-24. A similar position could be articulated for
the Orthodox Jewish community as well.
202. Professor Howe suggested an interpretation of the two clauses which is more
fundamentally consistent with the historical intent of the first amendment. It seemed to
him that:
[T]oday's liberals have not sufficiently recognized the complexities of motive
which fashioned the policy of separation, [and that] the justices have been
compelled by the very structure of the First Amendment's prohibitions to ac-
knowledge [until recently] that it sought to do something more secure the people
from ecclesiastical depradations. For the prohibition is not only against the
enactment of laws respecting an establishment of religion; it is against the making
of laws prohibiting its free exercise. The specificity of this second assurance
makes it clear beyond controversy that the framers could not have intended the
policy of separation, enunciated in the prohibition of establishment, to frustrate
or inhibit the religious experience.
M. DEWOLFE HOWE, supra note 44, at 10.
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responsible for the apparent irreconcilability between the establishment
clause and the free exercise clause. Alternatively, it might be required to
choose between the two conflicting first amendment values, nonestab-
lishment and free exercise, in situations in which both cannot be
achieved simultaneously. Neither is a determination which the Court
would enjoy making. In one case, it must concede and explain its error.
This might require tacit recognition of the role of religious preconcep-
tions in its earlier decisions. In the other, it must decide which of two
fundamental principles of the Constitution must be sacrificed if both
cannot be fully realized. Neither is an enviable task but the Supreme
Court cannot continue to do implicitly what it refrains from doing explic-
itly without bringing disapprobation upon itself.
At the most fundamental level, the conflict between a Protestant world
view and that of some other religions as it relates to the question of
public support for religiously oriented schools is that while it is the
essence of Protestantism to maintain separate spheres of religious and
civil activity, it is equally fundamental to Catholicism, Orthodox
Judaism, and some other religious faiths that such a separation is incon-
ceivable. The public school, which is the reflection of this prevailing
Protestant ideology, conflicts, at the most fundamental level with the
beliefs and practices of observers of the other tradition. 03 There is
therefore no satisfactory choice available to the observant parent who
holds this alternative world view. His children must, according to the
fundamental tenets of his faith, pursue an integrated education, one in
which secular knowledge and religious training are necessarily inter-
twined. It is not that secular education is irrelevant or even less im-
portant, it is simply that it must not, indeed cannot, be separated from an
ancient and profound religious ideology. 204
The implicit assumption in the Supreme Court's approach to the issue
of aid to parochial schools, that "neutrality" under the establishment
clause is achieved by the availability of public education for all children,
completely ignores this basic fact. The choice is not between public and
parochial education; it is between public education and religion. In order
203. See notes 197, 199 & 201 supra, & 204-05 infra.
204. As a matter of fact, the State maintains a system of schools which is not
completely satisfactory to Catholics, inasmuch as no place is given to morality
and religion. Since the Church realizes that the teaching of religion and instruc-
tion in the secular branches cannot rightfully or successfully be separated one
from the other, she is compelled to maintain her own system of schools for
general education as well as for religious instruction. ...
2 A. STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 654 (1950) (quoting Monsignor
John A. Ryan).
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to receive the benefits of public education under the Court's interpreta-
tion of the establishment clause, these believers must sacrifice the very
essence of their respective faiths-the belief that the religious and secu-
lar orders cannot be separated. This is not a "neutral" result. It provides
Protestants and nonbelievers with the benefits of public education while
denying others the benefits of public education unless they are willing to
succumb to the prevailing ideology of separation. This result is offensive
to the principle of free exercise as protected by the first amendment.
The explanation for the Court's failure to recognize this aspect of the
establishment-free exercise problem and its failure to acknowledge the
inequality of the freedom of religion which results is attributable to the
longstanding and deeply ingrained liberal tradition in American law
which does not concern itself with substantive inequality. Within this
tradition, the commitment of the law to equality is restricted to a formal
conception of equal access to legal and political institutions. Substantive
inequality is attributed to the nature of things. Differential access to
power and material wealth is explained by the unequal distribution of
natural talent and capacity-not by differential treatment under existing
law.2"5 The law treats all persons equally. In the words of Anatole
France, "The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the
poor man to sleep under bridges." ' 2°6 Likewise, the Constitution, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court, permits the states to provide free
secular education to all children-Catholics, Orthodox Jews, Protes-
tants, and nonbelievers-in the public schools.
The problem is, however, infinitely more complex than the compara-
tively simple question of equality of educational opportunity. It is not
merely the gap between a conception of formal legal equality of access
and the resulting substantive inequality of benefit. The fact that the
resulting inequality is inextricably the product of the exercise of the right
to freedom of religion poses a whole new dimension to the problem.
Children are being denied participation in a substantial public benefit
precisely because of their (or their parents) decision to undertake the
obligations imposed upon them by their faith. It is clear not only that the
denial of access to free educational services results from the free exer-
cise of religion, but that the availability of public education, under these
circumstances, works as a disincentive to free exercise. The economic
pressure to forego religiously oriented education is strong, particularly
among low income Americans.
205. The prevailing liberal ideologies of meritorious reward and the rule of law present
formidable obstacles to even a discussion of substantive equality.
206. A. FRANCE, LELYS ROUGE ch. 7 (1894).
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When a state imposed a tax on the sale of religious literature, the Court
struck it down as a burden upon the free exercise of religion. 207 The
economic consequences of such a tax are considerably less severe than
those which result from the inability to participate in so substantial a
benefit as free education, yet the Court has given little more recognition
than a deferential nod toward the financial burdens of parochial school
parents. Nor has it demonstrated any inclination toward a type of equal
protection analysis in such situations.2'0 An analysis based upon equal
protection criteria might prove fruitful. However, it might be impeded by
the same ideological biases which underlie the Court's direct analysis of
establishment and free exercise cases. Although there is basis for an
equal protection analysis, 209 it is likely that the Court would implement
its traditional nonestablishment rhetoric to find a compelling state inter-
est which would justify any discrimination established.
In the last analysis, the success of any such claim to equal protection
or free exercise must ultimately rest upon a substantive conception of
those rights. It is unlikely that the present Court will embark upon the
journey from a limited conception of formal legal equality to a broad
conception of substantive social equality; and perhaps it should not, if it
must do so by the imposition of a constitutional mandate upon the states.
However, the Court should not stand as an obstacle to the enactment of
state legislation recognizing the substantive content of individual
rights-in particular, the right to the free exercise of religion. 21° The
Court's recent approach can lead only to continued invalidation of state
legislation coupled with an increase in state-federal antagonism and a
consistent undercurrent of public criticism.
One of the most persistent problems for the Supreme Court in
constitutional decision-making is maintaining its own legitimacy. The
207. Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944).
208. In his dissenting opinion in Meek v. Pittenger, Justice Burger criticized the Court
for precisely this omission. 421 U.S. at 387.
209. In the case of a challenge to state aid to parochial schools, for instance, the state
might argue that the failure to provide such assistance would result in a denial of the equal
protection of the laws to children (and parents) who attend religiously oriented schools.
Such aid, the state might argue, does not advance religion, but merely equalizes the
secular educational benefits of all children attending schools within the state. Since the
decision not to provide equal benefits to all such children would necessarily impinge upon
the fundamental right to the free exercise of religion (e.g., choice of parochial over public
school), any such decision must be based upon a compelling state interest to offset what
would seem, on its face, to be a suspect classification (defined by religious criteria) and to
interfere with a fundamental right.
210. See the earlier discussion of the proper role of the Supreme Court in mandating
constitutional behavior as opposed to forbidding unconstitutional behavior, supra at 43-
44.
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Court is not, after all, asked to decide important questions of law which
are at the same time important problems of social, political, and econom-
ic relations simply because it is the repository of superior wisdom. It is
authorized by the Constitution to decide cases and controversies arising
under the "Constitution [and] the Laws of the United States . .."" It
ought, therefore, to exercise a reasonable amount of circumspection in
repeatedly invalidating state legislative efforts in such a sensitive area of
law.
The conception of a federal government with strong but clearly de-
fined and limited powers is one which dominated the constitutional
convention at Philadelphia. 21 2 The judiciary, like the two political
branches of the new government, was given limited authority. The essen-
tial concern of the founding fathers which formed their conception of
limited sovereignty for the federal government was their jealousy of
state sovereignty. 21 3 While their very presence at the convention be-
speaks their recognition of a need for a strong central authority, it does
not indicate a unanimity of opinion as to how and to what extent the
central government should be so empowered. The present constellation
of state and federal powers was not contemplated by the original fram-
ers. It is instead the result of social, economic, and political change. But
the substantial redistribution of authority from the state to the federal
government ought not to be interpreted as a total abdication of state
sovereignty. The states retain significant autonomy in matters of educa-
tional policy and public welfare. 21 4 Only when the constitutional mandate
is clear and unequivocal should the Supreme Court strike down efforts
by state legislatures to provide public welfare benefits to more citizens
when the rights of other citizens are not compromised in any measurable
way.
It is surely too late in the development of contemporary legal con-
sciousness to suggest that the exercise of prudential judgment should be
left to the legislature alone in the exercise of the sovereign authority
delegated to it. Similarly, it no longer seems plausible from our post-
realist perspective to argue that the judiciary is by its very nature
confined to the articulation and application of legal rules. Conceding the
foregoing propositions, it is nevertheless useful to suggest that, as lim-
iting conceptions, these ideas continue to mediate between our fear of
211. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
212. M. FERRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 42-52
(1913). See also FEDERALIST PAPERS, nos. 6, 9-10, 21, 23, 41, 45, & 85.
213. J. MADISON, FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 45.
214. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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judicial tyranny and our eschatological expectations of judicial activism
when the "political" departments seem inadequate to deal with the
problems of the day. We are neither willing to delegate wholesale legisla-
tive powers to the judiciary nor are we ready to demand a return of these
"quasi-legislative" powers assumed by it under the guise of interpreta-
tion, application, and review of existing legislation. Somewhere between
judicial hegemony and impotence lies a realm of activism tempered with
appropriate restraint. This is an extraordinarily difficult concept of
sovereignty to define because it is one which must of necessity be
capable of expansion and contraction as circumstances warrant. But it
does have limits and the best judges are those who most accurately
perceive, in any given temporal or conceptual framework, the bound-
aries within which their judicial power must be exercised.
Judges are motivated by ideological considerations as well as by the
legal and political constraints under which they operate. There is nothing
new in the suggestion that legal thought, like other categories of intellec-
tual inquiry, is infused with the ideological biases of its creators." 5 That
fact, however, remains a persistent thorn in the side of a judiciary
seeking to maintain its legitimacy in a world of perpetual social and
political flux.
The religion clauses are peculiarly susceptible to ideological interpre-
tation because of the pervasive impact of religious ideology on categories
of thought. America has been a predominantly Protestant culture, and
remains so in spite of its large proportion of non-Protestant population.
The insistence of the Supreme Court on imposing a single, inflexible
standard upon church-state relationships throughout the states under the
establishment clause has not contributed to the creation of a climate in
which non-Protestant ideology can flourish in the public arena. Although
it is clear from legislation reaching the Court that sympathy for other
religious groups has risen, particularly in the area of education, it is
equally apparent that the Court's flexibility quotient in the area of
establishment has not risen. It has, if anything, diminished.
It is perplexing that as the judicial tolerance for political compromise
in the area of religion has decreased, the Court's expressed concern for
"political divisiveness" engendered by religious issues has increased. 216
215. Not only has the ideological character of thought been a major preoccupation of
such theorists as Marx, Weber, and Mannheim, but legal scholars and judges, as well,
have labored to expose and criticize the manifestations of ideological biases in legal
thought. The political polemics of Justice Felix Frankfurter as well as pleas from academ-
ics, such as Professor Wechsler, e.g., H. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Consti-
tutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959), are illustrative.
216. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372, 374-75 (1975); PEARL v. Nyquist,
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The proliferation of legislation accommodating diverse religious groups
in the free exercise of their respective faiths tends to support the conclu-
sion that the "political divisiveness" of such legislative solutions has
diminished. Nevertheless, the Court's continuing rejection of these legis-
lative solutions appears to be creating just the potential for political
divisiveness it purportedly seeks to prevent 217 by keeping the issues alive
in state legislatures seeking to discover ways to overcome the constitu-
tional obstacles raised by the Court in this area. 218
State legislatures are, in the final analysis, better barometers of the
social and political climate in America than the Supreme Court, which
tends to be more isolated from the realities of political life. It would be
dangerous and incorrect to suggest that public opinion ought to be a
reason for altering clear and unequivocal constitutional principles. But
there is often a relevant distinction to be drawn in the constitutional
decision-making process between questions of constitutional permissibil-
ity and questions of constitutional mandate. This is especially true when
the language of the Constitution itself is less than decisive.
One of the means by which the Court could extricate itself from the
presently irreconcilable morass of judicial opinions under the religion
clauses of the first amendment would be to give greater recognition to
the distinction between permissible and mandatory constitutional re-
sults.219 By permitting greater autonomy to state legislatures in the reso-
lution of problems of equality of access to educational benefits which
touch upon church-state relations, the Court might nevertheless uphold
the great tradition of noncoercion which has, in theory, characterized
religious toleration in the United States. 220 In so doing, it would promote
413 U.S. 756, 796-97 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 623 (1971); Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 694-95 (1970) (Harlan, J. concurring).
217. Chief Justice Burger chided the majority on this point in Meek v. Pittenger when
he said, "[i]ndeed, I see at least as much potential for divisive political debate in
opposition to the crabbed attitude the Court shows in this case." 421 U.S. at 386.
218. The Court, by its own acknowledgement, recognizes the dilemma it has created.
Justice Powell in his opinion for the Court in PEARL v. Nyquist, rejecting New York's
tax credit plan, quipped, -[O]ur cases, however, have long since foreclosed the notion
that mere statistical assurances will suffice to sail between the Scylla and Charybdis of
,effect' and 'entanglement.' " 413 U.S. at 787-88.
219. A recent example of such a distinction can be found in cases dealing with the
requirement of a jury trial under the fourteenth amendment. E.g., Apodaca v. Oregon,
406 U.S. 404 (1972); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
220. The increasing difficulties faced by private schools in our country are no
reason at all for this Court to readjust the admittedly rough-hewn limits on
governmental involvement with religion which are found in the First and Four-
teenth Amendments. But, quite understandably, these difficulties can be expect-
ed to lead to efforts on the part of those who wish to keep alive pluralism in
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not only greater equality of educational opportunity for all American
school children, but legislative autonomy and responsibility as well. It
would thereby transform PEARL v. Nyquist and Meek v. Pittenger into
the "Lochners" of a new era of expanded freedom of religion for all
Americans.
Until the Supreme Court abandons its assumptions that true religious
liberty can be achieved for all people under the first amendment within
its antiseptic separationist model of religious and secular activity, the
guarantee of religious freedom for all people within the United States
will remain elusive. To the extent that the establishment clause continues
to be infused with the Protestant ideal of complete separation of public
and private spheres of activity the establishment clause will stand as a
barrier to true religious freedom for millions of Americans.22" '
If we are not to arrive by indirection at that point of religious intoler-
ance which we avoid by design, we must persuade the Supreme Court
that sensitivity by state legislatures to the needs of non-Protestant reli-
gious groups seeking social equality does not constitute a first step
education to obtain through legislative channels forms of permissible public
assistance which were not thought necessary a generation ago. Within the limits
permitted by the Constitution, these decisions are quite rightly hammered out on
the legislative anvil. If the Constitution does indeed allow for play in the legisla-
tive joints . . . the Court must distinguish between a new exercise of power
within constitutional limits and an exercise of legislative power which transgres-
ses those limits. I believe the Court has failed to make that distinction here, and I
therefore dissent.
413 U.S. at 813 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
221. 1 think the Court's mechanistic concept of the Establishment Clause is histor-
ically unsound and constitutionally wrong. I think the process of constitutional
decision in the area of the relationships between government and religion de-
mands considerably more than the invocation of broadbrushed rhetoric ....
And I think that the guarantee of religious liberty embodied in the Free Exercise
Clause affirmatively requires government to create an atmosphere of hospitality
and accommodation to individual belief or disbelief ..... I think our Constitu-
tion commands the positive protection by government of religious freedom...
for each of us . . . . With all respect, I think it is the Court's duty to face up to
the dilemma posed by the conflict between the Free Exercise Clause of the
Constitution and the Establishment Clause as interpreted by this Court. . .. For
so long as the resounding but fallacious fundamentalist rhetoric of some of our
Establishment Clause opinions remains on our books, to be disregarded at will as
in the present case, or to be indiscriminately invoked as in the Schempp case, so
long will the possibility of consistent and perceptive decision in this most difficult
and delicate area of constitutional law be impeded and impaired. And so long, I
fear, will the guarantee of true religious freedom in our pluralistic society be
uncertain and insecure.
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 415-17 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
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toward establishment. Rather it represents a step toward a more substan-
tive conception of free exercise.
What is needed in this sensitive and important area of constitutional
law is a model for decision-making which is relevant to the contemporary
social, political, and economic context. Such a model must be built upon
a revised set of assumptions about the establishment and free exercise
clauses of the first amendment. First, these clauses must be seen as
inextricably related to one another, infused with a common goal of
promoting and assuring religious liberty for all Americans. Second, the
meaning of nonestablishment must be revised to comport with a rea-
soned assessment of its function in the contemporary world. Visions of
the Spanish Inquisition are not useful as models of the eventualities
against which the establishment clause must guard in the closing decades
of the twentieth century. We have been fighting too many paper tigers
and may ultimately lose the real battle to secure religious freedom
against the effects of prejudice and coercion. A balance must be struck
between permissible and impermissible state involvement with the reli-
gious enterprise. This balance must assure freedom of religion while
preventing the unfortunate consequences of establishment and it must
provide adequate guidance to legislators, in order to avoid the continuing
confrontation between the states and the Supreme Court over these
constitutional issues.
One established conception which must be abandoned is the notion
that only a total separation of secular and religious functions can assure
our freedom from established religion. Without the interment of this
fundamentally Protestant world view, religious freedom will exist for
many Americans only at the cost of foregoing substantial secular bene-
fits available to those whose views conform to the separationist ideolo-
gy. We might return to the mode of analysis suggested by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in McGowan v. Maryland: "once it is determined that a
challenged statute is supportable as implementing other substantial inter-
ests than the promotion of belief, the guarantee prohibiting religious
'establishment' is satisfied. ' 222
This would render irrelevant all issues of peripheral or incidental aid to
religion. It would permit the state to provide secular benefits to all
individuals who belong to the category requiring them, without exempt-
ing those who for reasons of faith are to receive those benefits within a
sectarian environment. As long as the secular benefits in fact flow to the
individuals sought to be benefited, there should be little need for the
222. 366 U.S. at 466.
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state to concern itself with any incidental benefit which may inure to
institutions, whether secular or religious.
In this way, those whose religious ideology requires integration of the
secular and religious aspects of life would be able to share equally in the
multitude of public benefits without sacrificing their religious beliefs.
This would enhance the substantive quality of the right to free exercise
and would in no conceivable way tend toward establishing any religion.
In the words of Chief Justice Burger,
One can only hope that, at some future date, the Court will
come to a more enlightened and tolerant view of the First
Amendment's guarantee of free exercise of religion, thus
eliminating the denial of equal protection to children in church-
sponsored schools, and take a more realistic view that carefully
limited aid to children is not a step toward establishing a state
religion .... 223
223. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. at 387 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
